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Product risk is important to firms’ enterprise risk management. This dissertation 
focuses on product risk in the U.S. life insurance and health insurance industries. In 
particular, we add new dimensions to the measurement of product risk for these industries, 
and we explore how these industries manage product risk in a context of other enterprise 
risks. 
In this dissertation, we identify new product risks, propose new measures, and 
study the management of these risks. In the life insurance industry, we identify a new 
type of product risk, the guarantee risk, caused by variable annuities with guaranteed 
living benefits (VAGLB). We propose a value-at-risk type measure inspired by the risk-
based capital C3 Phase II to quantify the guarantee risk. In the health insurance industry, 
where the degree of uncertainty varies for different types of health insurance policies, we 
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develop four exposure-based risk measures to capture health insurers’ product risks. Then 
we study how life and health insurers manage product risks (and asset risks) by using 
capital in the context of other risks and appropriate controls. We add to the literature in 
the life insurance industry by examining the relationship between capital and risks when 
the guarantee risk is accounted for. In the health insurance industry, to our knowledge, no 
similar research on the relationship between capital and risks has been conducted. In view 
of the current topicality of health insurance, our research therefore adds a timely 
contribution to the understanding of health insurer risk management in an era of health 
care reform. 
Capital structure theories, transaction cost economics, and insurers’ risk-taking 
behaviors provide the theoretical foundation for our research. As to methodology, we 
implement standard capital structure models for the life and health insurance industries 
using data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) annual 
filings of life/health insurers and health insurers. Simultaneous equations modeling is 
used to model life and health insurers’ enterprise risk management. And the estimation is 
conducted by the generalized estimation equations (GEE).  
We find that both U.S. life/health insurers and health insurers prudently build up 
capital as they experience more product risk and asset risk controlling for the other 
enterprise risks. We also find that life/health insurers may be using derivatives as a partial 
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Insurance companies are financial institutions that perform two principal 
functions: They price and underwrite risks, and they invest the premiums that they are 
paid for assuming those risks. Policyholders transfer some of the financial consequences 
of risks of various perils to insurers in exchange for premium payments. Insurers invest 
pools of premiums in real estate and financial instruments, thus providing a source of 
liquidity to support the growth and development of the economy. The financial health of 
the insurance industry is therefore of considerable importance. In particular, the practices 
by which insurers manage the risks of their products, of their investments, and of other 
aspects of their endeavors are of great concern. In this dissertation, we focus on the U.S. 
life insurance and health insurance industries. Among various enterprise risks faced by 
life and health insurers such as asset risk, product risk and regulatory risk, we focus on 
their product risk. Specifically, we develop a new method to quantify life insurers’ new 
product risk generated by variable annuities with guaranteed benefits and find proper 
product risk measures for health insurers. Then we study their use of capital (and 
derivative hedging for life insurers only) to manage the risks emanating from their 
products, in particular, and from other aspects of their activities in general. 
U.S. life and health insurance industries are confronted with opportunities and 
challenges. Financial market innovation enables life insurers to expand their lines of 
business and create variable annuities with guarantees. However, increasing market 
volatility and the ongoing recession challenge life insurers’ ability to manage the new 
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risk inherent in this new product. The business activity of health insurers is likely to 
increase substantially after new healthcare legislation is fully in effect in 2014. However, 
continuously increasing medical costs and more federal government regulations make 
risk management of various health insurance products become health insurers’ top 
priority.      
For life insurers, in the past two decades, the boom in financial markets and 
increasing consumer demand for hedging longevity risk nurtured the rapid growth of the 
variable annuities with guaranteed benefits (VAGB) market. Differing from traditional 
variable annuities in which gain or loss of account value is solely at the annuitants’ own 
risk, VAGB provides annuitants various guarantees to protect account value from 
downside market risk while still preserving the potential for the annuitant to profit from 
upside markets. Life insurers profit from VAGB by collecting fees for providing the 
various guarantees.1 However, insurers confront exposure to the contractual guarantees of 
VAGB products. These exposures created challenges during the financial crisis that 
began in late 2007. In a market downturn, guarantees of VAGB contracts are triggered. 
Life insurers are obligated to cover the gap between annuitants’ real account value and 
the guaranteed contract value. In this way, VAGB guarantees added to the distress of life 
                                                          
1 “From 2003 to 2007, U.S. life insurance industry’s revenues grew by 15% or $108 billion, reaching $830 
billion in 2007, and cumulative profits over five years amounted to $165 billion. The main driver of the 
performance is variable annuities. In 2007, variable annuities sales amounted to $172 billion.” Responding 
to the Variable Annuities Crisis, McKinsey Working Papers on Risk, 2009 McKinsey & Company.  
“Living benefits are still driving retail VA sales, and in excess of 85% of VAs sales contain a living benefit 
rider.” Annuity Product Development Trends and Issues – VA Perspective, SOA Annual Meeting Session 




insurer balance sheets that were simultaneously being damaged by mortgage-backed 
securities and sinking equity and bond markets.  
Health insurers are faced with big challenges in rising medical costs and 
legislation. In the U.S., health insurers are important financial intermediaries in the 
healthcare delivery system. Health insurers underwrite risks of medical expenses, collect 
premiums from policyholders upfront and make payments to healthcare providers after 
medical services are delivered. Therefore, health insurers are at the risk of realized 
medical expenses surpassing collected premiums. In fact, driven by technology and 
prescription drugs, chronic disease, aging of the population and administrative cost, U.S. 
healthcare cost has been rising so fast that expenditure in healthcare already surpassed 
$2.3 trillion in 2008.2 In addition, health insurers might experience still more pressure 
after adoption of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). By imposing 
elimination of benefit caps, guaranteed insurability, and loss ratio minima, PPACA is 
likely to expose health insurers to more uncertainties regarding healthcare costs while 
attempting to control for premiums charged.  
Whether U.S. life and health insurers can meet these challenges and manage 
increasing risks well is important to the financial stability of the whole society. One 
major purpose of this dissertation is to shed light on life and health insurers’ possible risk 
management strategies toward new risks together with other enterprise risks by 
empirically investigating their historical risk-taking behaviors. Our approach is to extend 
                                                          




research on insurers’ product risks, which are uncertainties embedded in various 
insurance policies they underwrite.  Incorporating new measures of product risks, we 
study the use of capital (and derivative hedging for life insurers only) to manage major 
life and health insurer risks.  
We identify new product risks, propose new ways to measure risk and empirically 
analyze the management of these risks. In the life insurance industry, we identify a new 
type of product risk, the guarantee risk, caused by variable annuities with guaranteed 
living benefits (VAGLB). We propose a value-at-risk type measure inspired by the risk-
based capital C3 Phase II to quantify the guarantee risk. In the health insurance industry, 
we do not identify new product risks but we acknowledge that the degree of uncertainty 
varies for different types of health insurance policies. And taking that into account, we 
develop four exposure-based risk measures to capture health insurers’ product risks. Then 
we study how life and health insurers manage product risks together with certain other 
enterprise risks by using capital in the context of other risks and appropriate controls. Our 
findings suggest that both life and health insurers will need more capital to prepare for 
increasing product risks if they wish to avoid an increase in overall risk.  
The theoretical foundation for our research includes capital structure theories, 
transaction cost economics, and insurers’ risk-taking behaviors. As to empirical 
methodology, we employ simultaneous equation modeling in which the estimation is 
conducted by generalized estimating equations (GEE). The dataset we use for our 
analysis is provided by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 
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For analysis of the life insurance industry, we use life insurers’ annual filing 2006 – 2007. 
For analysis of the health insurance industry, we use health insurers’ annual filing 2001 – 
2008.  
Structure of the Dissertation 
 In Chapter 1, we discuss life and health insurers’ major enterprise risks and 
theories and methodologies used in our research. In particular, we focus on attributes of 
life and health insurers’ product risks. Chapter 1 comprises three sections. In the first 
section, we define life and health insurers’ product risks and review existing product risk 
measures. In the second section, we describe other enterprise risks of life and health 
insurers and their relationships with insurers’ products. In the third section, we first 
examine two insurers’ major risk management tools, capital and hedging. Then we 
review the literature on theoretical foundations and empirical research in the other 
industries. Finally, we propose hypotheses testing risk-taking behaviors for life and 
health insurers. 
Chapter 2 is exclusively about product risks. For life insurers, we identify the new 
product risk, guarantee risk, generated from life insurers’ innovative product, variable 
annuities with guaranteed benefits. Then we explain how we measure guarantee risk 
using a value-at-risk type measure. For health insurers, we first summarize factors related 
to their product risks. Then we formalize four exposure-based product risk proxies.  
Chapter 3 focuses on empirical analysis of insurers’ enterprise risk management 
using product risk proxies proposed in the previous chapter. For both life and health 
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insurers, we first describe the NAIC insurers’ annual statement datasets by presenting 
extensive summary statistics. Then we describe the estimation methodology for the 
empirical models that we employ. Finally, we discuss the empirical results, implications 

















An Overview of Insurers’ Enterprise Risks and Risk Management by 
Capital and Hedging 
1.1 Product Risk of Life and Health Insurers 
1.1.1 Product Risk  
Definition of Insurers’ Product Risk 
Risk is defined as the uncertainty about a future outcome.3 In finance, risk is 
usually measured by variability of uncertain future outcomes. Product risk is the 
uncertain consequence that arises from the nature and use of firms’ products or services. 
It takes different forms in different industries. For manufacturing industries, defects of 
products or inadequate instructions causing customers’ loss are known as manufacturers’ 
product liability risk. For financial industries, complex structured financial transactions 
resulting in investors’ economic loss can also expose financial institutions to product risk. 
We will adapt the general concept of product risk to the insurance industry. In particular, 
we will analyze factors contributing to insurers’ product risk by using a statistical model.         
Like other financial institutions, insurers market services rather than physical 
products. Insurers sell the assumption of risk, manifested as an insurance policy, or 
contract, that specifies the terms and conditions of the risk transfer. With some abuse of 
                                                          
3 Etti Baranoff, Patrick Brockett, and Yehuda Kahane,  Risk Management for Enterprises and Individuals, 
1st edition.  
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terminology, insurers commonly refer to these policies as “products”, by analogy with 
manufacturing firms. Insurers relieve their customers of some of the financial 
consequences of risks of ill health, death, loss of income, and other perils in return for 
premium payments that insurers accumulate and invest. The insurer is under no 
obligation to return any invested funds to its customers – unless and until the occurrence 
of triggering conditions specified in the policies. The prudent insurer maintains reserves 
sufficient to pay actuarially anticipated claims arising from triggered policies. 
We may define insurers’ product risk broadly as the uncertainty over whether 
collected premiums will cover future claims cost and costs of underwriting and 
administration. Premiums are prices insurers charge for reducing policyholders’ risks as 
specified in insurance contracts. Premiums are determined by estimates of the frequency 
and severity of future claims. However, the actual claims cost is only known afterwards 
when future claims happen. Therefore, it is uncertain whether collected premiums are 
sufficient to cover claims cost until the claims cost is realized. But the more accurate 
estimates on future claims reduce insurers’ uncertainties or risks carried in a specific 
product.  
Examining insurance theories can help us understand insurers’ product risk. The 
insurance business is built on risk reduction by risk pooling. By pooling a large number 
of homogeneous and independent loss exposures into classes, insurers realize risk 
reduction. Cummins (1974 and 1991), and Bowers, et al. (1986) use what they call 
individual risk theory to explain how insurance realizes risk reduction. 
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The following is a simple statistical model to illustrate insurers’ future claims cost. 
Suppose the total amount of claims in one year for a certain insurance product is a 
random variable SN, which is simply the sum of individual exposure units, Xi. N is the 









SN = total amount of claims in one year 
Xi = claim of exposure unit i 
N = number of individual exposure in the pool 
µ = mean loss per exposure unit 
σ2 = variance of loss of each exposure unit 
σij = covariance of the ith and jth exposure units 
If individual claims are identically distributed, the mean and variance of insurers’ 
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If there is no covariance among exposure units (σij = 0), the variance of total 
claim cost will be Nσ2. According to the Law of Large Numbers (LLN) and the Central 
Limit Theorem (CLT), as long as the mean and variance of individual loss exposure are 
finite and N is large enough, the mean or average of individual loss exposure follows a 
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By pooling loss exposures with homogeneous risk defined by σ, for the insurer, the risk 
of loss exposure has been reduced from σ for an individual to N/σ  for the mean. 
Accordingly, the risk of total claim loss is σN . In other words, for insurers, risk of each 
exposure unit on average decreases with more members in the pool, but the total claim 
loss risk still goes up with more exposure units. If the covariance among exposure units is 













2 2 σσ , and positive correlation 
of exposure units increases the risk of total claim loss. Using this model, insurers’ 
product risk can actually be interpreted as how accurately insurers measure risk of 
individual exposure unit and the extent of correlation among exposure units.  
Whether insurers can measure risk of individual exposure well depends on the 
extent to which insurance coverage is explicitly defined. As we discussed already, 
insurance products are essentially financial contracts, which are supposed to specify 
coverage explicitly – the benefits and obligations for both insurers and policyholders. 
Insurers’ actuarial pricing is based on coverage specifications in the contract. Therefore, 
an implicitly specified insurance contract might result in inaccurate estimation of risk of 
individual loss exposure unit (σ), which increases the insurers’ product risk. The 
connection between the implicitly specified insurance contract and risk exposure  is based 
on contract theory and transaction cost economics (TCE) introduced by R. H. Coase and 
further developed by Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985, and 1990). Baranoff (1993) applied 
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contract theory and TCE on life insurers’ product risk analysis. The author differentiated 
risk levels for life insurers’ major lines of business by completeness of insurance 
contracts. Low, medium and high risk levels are assigned to annuities, life insurance, and 
health insurance, respectively.4   
Another factor contributing to insurers’ product risk is the covariance or 
correlation among individual exposure units. Using the formula for risk of total claim loss, 
negative covariance of exposure units helps to reduce insurers’ product risk, while 
positive covariance results in greater product risk. The difficulty of measuring covariance 
of individual exposure units is that covariance or correlation could change suddenly after 
some triggering event. Triggering events could be natural or man-made disasters, 
catastrophes and pandemic diseases, etc.  Insurers might be confronted with a sudden 
spike in product risk because of these events. Under these circumstances, insurers’ 
reserve could be exhausted because of the loss exposure in the affected area. Allstate 
Corp. reported that severe weather drove up catastrophic losses to $2 billion in the second 
quarter of 2011.5 Also, pandemic disease such as swine flu (H1N1), avian flu (H5N1) 
and SARS resulted in big losses for both life/health insurers and property/casualty 
insurers. The recent financial crisis severely affected insurers as rising covariances spread 
the crisis contagiously.  
                                                          
4 Williamson described three types of contracts in his book “The Economic Institutions of Capitalism” 
(1985): classical contracts, neoclassical contracts, and relational contracts. Classical contracts are for the 
transaction of standard products or resources; neoclassical contracts are designed for non-standard 
products, which are riskier than classical contracts; while relational contracts, the most risky ones, are 
subject to more uncertainties that cannot be specified in the contracts. Baranoff (1993) applied this 
framework to life insurers’ product portfolio.      
5 “Allstate says 2Q catastrophe losses reach $2B”, The Wall Street Journal, June 16th 2011. 
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As the name suggests, variable annuities with guaranteed benefits provide annuity 
holders a guaranteed account value regardless of the current market performance. This 
means that life insurers must guarantee policyholders either return of the amount of initial 
investment, certain annual income or roll-up, or flexible withdrawals. Premiums for 
insurance-type guarantees are fees charged to variable annuity accounts. However, the 
2008 financial market crash made the majority of variable annuity accounts lose money, 
directly challenging life insurers providing VAGB products. Meanwhile, on the left-
hand-side of the balance sheet, life insurers’ asset portfolios depreciated at the same time 
aggravating the situation and depleting their capital.  
So far, we have defined product risk for insurers. Using a simple model in 
individual risk theory, we explained possible sources of product risk by decomposing 
insurers’ product risk into individual risk and the correlation between individual risks. In 
the following section, we will discuss empirical measures to assess insurers’ product risk.  
Methods to Assess Insurers’ Product Risk  
 We focus on exposure-based risk measure and volatility-based risk measure to 
empirically quantify product risk. We developed a risk measure diagram (Figure 1.1) 
showing the major and subtypes of risk measures. The following discussion is based on 





Exposure-based Risk Measure 
“Exposure” refers to the condition of being at risk of financial loss or an amount 
of at risk.6 In risk management and insurance studies, exposure is also a term used to 
describe the enterprise, property, person, or activity facing a potential loss. 7  In our 
understanding, exposure may contribute to risk level from two perspectives: actual 
amount of potential losses and uncertainty of losses of exposure units. Higher risk level is 
associated with larger amount and/or greater uncertainty of losses.  
Exposure-based risk measure can be used to quantify insurers’ enterprise risks 
such as product risk and asset risk on different aspects. It forecasts the magnitude of 
potential financial loss caused by insurers’ underwriting and investment activities. It can 
also represent insurers’ product risk and asset risk by examining the composition of 
                                                          
6 Merriam-Webster online dictionary: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exposure 
7 Risk Management for Enterprises and Individuals, Etti Baranoff, Patrick Brockett and Yehuda Kahane, 
Flat World Knowledge, Inc. 
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insurers’ product and asset portfolio. Higher risk level is assigned to product and asset 
portfolios concentrating on product and asset types with greater uncertainty. However, an 
exposure-based risk measure is not capable of capturing the fluctuation of financial losses 
or changes of insurers’ product and asset portfolio concentration overtime.  
Exposure-based risk measure is essentially measuring risks by size of exposures. 
Exposure-based risk measures can take different forms. Major forms can be absolute, 
relative and value-at-risk types.  
(i) Absolute-Type Exposure-based Risk Measure 
The absolute-type exposure-based risk measure uses the actual size of exposure. 
For instance, suppose that a life insurance company underwrote life insurance contracts 
totaling $10 million at face value. Actuarial calculation will forecast possible claims and 
record corresponding reserves for those contracts. The size of forecasted loss exposure, 
reserves, and face value all represent the magnitude of potential loss. Therefore, they can 
serve as an absolute-type exposure-based risk measure for the life insurance contracts.  
(ii) Relative-Type Exposure-Based Risk Measure 
Relative-weight and relative-size are subtypes of relative-type exposure-based 
risk measure. The relative-weight measure focuses on weight or allocation of risk 
exposures on different risk levels of exposure units. For instance, life/health insurers’ 
product portfolios comprise life insurance, annuities, and health insurance. A percentage 
of writings for a specific product to total writings can be used to proxy insurer’s product 
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risk.8 This measure focuses on insurers’ product concentration. An insurer concentrating 
on highly risky product experiences greater product risk. Two insurers with the same 
magnitude of absolute exposure-based product risk might exhibit quite different relative-
weight-type exposure-based product risk because they might focus on different lines of 
business or product. On the other hand, relative-size exposure-based risk measure 
incorporates firm size as a scale. Insurers’ size can be measured by total assets, liabilities, 
writings and premium income. An insurance policy with a given amount of loss 
exposure9  might be on a different risk level for a large insurer vis-à-vis a small insurer 
because a large insurer usually has a larger risk pool than a small insurer. Therefore, loss 
exposure relative to insurer size is a better risk measure than absolute-type risk measure 
when it comes to cross-sectional analysis.    
(iii) Value-at-Risk Exposure-Based Risk Measure 
The value-at-risk exposure-based risk measure (VaR) has been widely-used in 
financial industries. After the 1987 financial crisis, financial industries were in great need 
of risk management measures that could describe or capture their possible losses under 
extreme events. Developed by J.P. Morgan in 1994, VaR was later accepted by the U.S. 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Basel II Accord worldwide as a standard 
measure for market risk.10 “VaR calculates the worst loss over a given horizon at a given 
                                                          
8 Baranoff and Sager (2002) developed product risk for life insurance industry in this way. 
9 Assuming large and small insurers are underwriting similar insurance products for similar risk pools. 




confidence level under normal market conditions.”11 In essence, VaR calculation is based 
on probability distribution of loss for a given portfolio generated by Monte Carlo 
simulation in a specific time horizon. The VaR calculation usually goes through the 
following processes: determine the time horizon; select degree of certainty required; 
create a probability distribution of likely returns for portfolio under consideration; and 
finally read the VaR result from the distribution created.12 Even though it is a commonly 
used risk measure in the industry, VaR has met with criticisms such as the sub-additive 
problem. 13  Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) found that banks’ reporting ex ante VaR 
forecasts underestimated their risk. In chapter 2 section 1 of this dissertation, we will 
show calculation of VaR exposure-based risk measure step by step.      
Volatility-Based Risk Measure  
Volatility-based risk measure is widely used to quantify risk of financial 
instruments and portfolios. In finance, volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of 
returns of financial instruments in a given time horizon. Historical volatility, implied 
volatility and stochastic volatility can all be measured. In this dissertation, we focus on 
historical volatility. Using volatility-based risk measure, we are actually defining risk as 
variation or standard deviation in statistics.  The more volatile or the greater the standard 
deviation of a financial instrument’s return is, the more risky the financial instrument is.  
As an ex ante risk measure, volatility-based risk measure has the disadvantage that it is 
                                                          
11 “Value-at-Risk: An Overview of Analytical VaR”, Roman Berry, Investment Analytics and Consulting, 
September 2008 
12 “VAR Understanding and Applying Value-at-Risk”, KPMG Risk Publications, 1997  
13 ‘Sub-additive problem’ means that the portfolio VaR can be greater than the sum of VaRs of portfolio’s 
instruments. “Measuring Market Risk”, Dowd, Kevin, John Wiley & Sons, 2005.  
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affected by time horizon, which means that the risk changes with the historical time 
period. As a popular methodology to quantify financial risks, volatility-based risk 
measure can also be used to measure the product risk. However, the effectiveness of this 
measure when applied to product risk depends on the variability of product risk 
exposures overtime.  
 The above discussion covered some commonly used risk measures. For industry-
wise study, we suggest the relative exposure-based risk measure to quantify insurers’ 
product risk for the following reasons. First, we have already argued above the advantage 
of relative measures to absolute measures. Second, the business-strategy hypothesis (see 
Baranoff and Sager 2003) suggests that product focus should be a relatively stable choice 
for insurers. If the product focus does not vary frequently, then the volatility of product 
risk may be relatively low. Moreover, insurers file financial statements to NAIC on an 
annual or quarterly basis, thus providing only sparse historical data for the calculation of 
volatility. Thus, volatility-based product risk measures may not be as appropriate a 
measure for capturing product risk as it is for market risk.  
1.1.2 Life Insurers’ Product Risk  
Life Insurers’ Products 
 U.S. life insurers’ major insurance products include life insurance, annuities, 
accident and health insurance, reinsurance and deposit type insurance such as Guaranteed 
Insurance Contracts (GICs).  The major types may be further divided into subtypes by 
coverage or terms and conditions. Life insurance is thus classified into term life, whole 
18 
 
life, universal life, variable life and variable universal life insurance products. 14 An 
annuity provides for an accumulation period, the time when premiums are paid to the 
insurer, and a payout period, the time when the insurer pays out income to the annuitant. 
An annuitant can select fixed or variable income payouts and deferred or immediate 
payout start.15 Accident and health insurance covers a broad spectrum of products such as 
comprehensive, dental, vision, disability and long-term care. 16 On U.S. life insurers’ 
annual filing to National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), they also 
report life, annuities, accident and health products separated by types of policyholders, 
which can be individual or group. Table 1.1 shows aggregate premiums for each major 
line of life insurers’ business from 2005 to 2008. 
Table 1.1 Life Insurers' Premiums Writings by Line of Business (in millions of dollars) 
Year Life Insurance Annuities Accident & Health Reinsurance Total* 
2005 $155,363 $288,552 $122,523 $58,667 $626,431 
2006 $166,247 $310,579 $142,892 $61,472 $681,189 
2007 $184,139 $327,635 $154,786 $69,724 $736,284 
2008 $170,157 $347,147 $168,644 $72,579 $758,529 
* Total writing is greater than the sum of life insurance, annuities, accident & health and reinsurance because 
there are other miscellaneous products 
 
Understanding certain aspects of life insurer accounting will facilitate an 
understanding of how product risks affect life insurers. Life insurers keep two account 
books to distinguish their own finances from fiduciary client finances. Life insurers 
account for their own finances in the general account and for fiduciary funds in the 
                                                          
14 “Risk Management and Insurance”, E.G. Baranoff, Wiley, 2004 
15 “Risk Management and Insurance”, S.E. Harrington and G.R. Niehaus, McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2004  
16 Baranoff (1993) documented extensively life insurers’ products.  
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separate account. On the general account, life insurers’ product risk arises from the 
adequacy, or not, of reserves for all future claims. If claims surpass actuarial reserves, life 
insurers must allocate capital to close the gap. The separate account is to record lines of 
business such as variable life, variable annuities, modified guaranteed annuities, and 
securities lending, which involve investment features in the insurance contracts. The 
value of the separate account is marked to market. Absent the guarantee features of some 
variable annuity products, life insurers are not responsible to policyholders for gain or 
loss in the separate account. However, given the guarantees of some variable annuities, it 
is possible for life insurers’ separate account liability to surpass reserves. Under this 
circumstance, life insurers will transfer capital from their general account to the separate 
account. By this means, VAGB adds another dimension to life insurers’ product risk.  We 
will discuss this risk in detail in chapter 2. Since 2010, the NAIC has required life 
insurers to disclose more of their activities in separate accounts on the general account 
annual filing. For example, the NAIC requires life insurers to report the amount paid by 
the general account to the separate account due to separate account guarantees for 
variable annuity products during the past five years.17  
Existing Product Risk Measure for Life Insurers  
 Baranoff and Sager (2002) developed relative-weight exposure-based risk 
measure to quantify life insurers’ product risk. Specifically, they use the ratios of 
premium writings of life insurers’ major lines of business, life, annuities, health, and 
reinsurance, to total premiums writings. Baranoff and Sager (2002) also presented a 
                                                          
17 “Blanks Agenda Items Submission Form”, NAIC Blanks Working Group, November 2009 
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theoretical foundation using contract theory and transaction cost economics to 
differentiate product risk levels for major lines of business. Since product risk levels of 
different lines of business are intrinsically different, a product risk measure capturing 
weights allocated to different products works better than the measure by exposure relative 
to firm size. Table 1.2 presents the distribution of life insurers’ product risk as a measure 
developed by Baranoff and Sager (2002).     
Table 1.2 Life Insurers' Major Lines of Business Premiums Writings to Total Writings † 
  P1 Median P3 Mean Stdev   P1 Median P3 Mean Stdev 
  2005   2006 
Plife 0.018 0.301 0.756 0.397 0.378   0.018 0.301 0.760 0.402 0.402 
Pannuity 0 0.001 0.187 0.168 0.300   0 0.000 0.174 0.167 0.301 
Phealth 0 0.039 0.553 0.276 0.365   0 0.035 0.534 0.276 0.368 
Preinsur 0 0.001 0.106 0.158 0.314   0 0.001 0.113 0.155 0.353 
  2007   2008 
Plife 0.017 0.316 0.788 0.405 0.388   0.018 0.293 0.777 0.398 0.385 
Pannuity 0 0.000 0.143 0.162 0.298   0 0.000 0.177 0.172 0.307 
Phealth 0 0.031 0.570 0.280 0.374   0 0.032 0.552 0.276 0.370 
Preinsur 0 0.001 0.097 0.152 0.319   0 0.001 0.102 0.152 0.309 
† P1 and P3 are the 25th percentile and 75th percentile. Plife, Pannuity, Phealth, and Preinsur are calculated 
as premium written in each line of business scaled by total written premiums. 
1.1.3 Health Insurers’ Product Risk  
Health Insurers’ Products 
  In the U.S., each insurer files an annual report with the NAIC in one and only one 
of the following categories Life, Health, or Property & Casualty. We used all insurers 
that file in the NAIC Health category. Insurers that file under the health category have 
self-identified as health insurers, their overwhelmingly predominant business is health 
insurance (medical coverage), and they write the majority of health business in the U.S. 
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There are many insurers that file with the NAIC under the Life category that also write a 
substantial amount of health policies. However, the Life category is much more 
heterogeneous and includes diversified insurers with interests in life, annuities, accident 
and health, and reinsurance lines. Because of their other interests, life filers with 
substantial health business may not behave as health insurers. Moreover, the reported 
data for Health filers is much richer and more useful for our purposes than for Life filers. 
Therefore, we limit our sample to Health filers.18   
The major products that health insurers underwrite include Comprehensive, 
Federal Employee Health Benefits Plans (FEHPs), Medicare, Medicare Supplement or 
MediGap, Medicaid, Dental, Vision, other health related products (including disability, 
prescription drug and long term care). 19  Each product includes specific coverage. 
Comprehensive insurance, as its name implies, intends to cover nearly all ailments of the 
whole body (except dental and vision). It covers people under the age of eligibility for 
Medicare (generally 65). FEHPs have similar coverage as Comprehensive but are only 
for federal government employees. Medicare and Medicaid are social insurance. Health 
insurers involved with these programs usually have contracts with the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Generally, Medicare is for people above 65 
years of age with at least minimal financial means, whereas Medicaid is a welfare 
program for the very poor. Medicare Supplement is voluntary private insurance that 
                                                          
18 In 2008, our sample numbered 878 health insurers and generated about $345 billion in health premiums. 
By comparison, there were 716 Life filers in 2008 that had at least some health business and collectively 
wrote about $170 billion in health premiums; but the Life premium figure is not directly comparable since 
it also includes accident and disability lines. 
19 “Official NAIC Annual Data Element Guide”, National Association of Insurance Commissioners. 
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covers Medicare participants for certain expenses that are not covered by Medicare. 
Dental and Vision insurance provide limited coverage for certain medical problems of the 
teeth and eyes, respectively. Table 1.3 shows aggregate premiums by lines of business 
from 2005 to 2008 on products we discussed above.  
Table 1.3 U.S. Health Insurers Total Premiums Income by Lines of Business 
Products 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Comprehensive $168,356,784,480  $174,842,149,930  $181,926,170,780  $186,455,753,365  
FEHPs  $19,762,520,243   $22,693,093,608   $24,679,756,725   $26,691,623,131  
Medicare  $35,146,355,690   $46,536,223,658   $55,630,296,618   $65,961,900,823  
MediGap  $7,683,594,238   $7,574,968,616   $7,443,773,107   $7,546,285,051  
Medicaid  $27,137,990,458   $30,018,294,622   $37,216,451,970   $42,265,127,923  
Dental  $6,245,785,466   $6,812,897,995   $7,239,510,422   $7,624,265,723  
Vision  $893,005,260   $985,281,069   $1,239,934,050   $1,336,723,111  
Other  $901,206,043   $7,461,366,112   $9,208,556,758   $8,243,480,334  
 
 The product risks of health insurers arise from the possibility that claims for 
medical services might surpass premiums collected. Baranoff and Sager (2002) argued 
that health insurers experience higher product risks than life insurers for several reasons. 
First, according to contract theory and transaction cost economics, health insurance 
contracts may be considered more incomplete and more relational than life insurance and 
annuity contracts. Second, the vagaries of law and regulation and the advance of medical 
technology create large uncertainties regarding the scope of health insurance coverage, 
regardless of contract specifications. Third, health insurers’ cash flow systems are more 
complex than the other insurers. Health insurers are financial intermediaries for the 
healthcare delivery system. Unlike life or property and casualty insurers, which collect 
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premiums from and pay claims to the same parties (i.e., policyholders), health insurers 
collect premiums from policyholders but pay claims to medical services providers. In this 
way, more agents with their respective uncertainties are introduced into the cash flow 
system, which increases health insurers’ product risks.   
Product Risk Measure for Health Insurers 
 We did not find previous literature proposing product risk measure for health 
insurers. Considering health insurance products’ special features of inelastic demand and 
homogeneity under higher risk level, we use relative-size exposure-based risk measure to 
quantify health insurers’ product risk. Exposure-based risk measure captures health 
insurers’ product risk better than volatility-based risk measure because of the social 
product feature of health insurance. As a social product, the demand for health insurance 
is inelastic compared to life insurance and annuities. Under this circumstance, we are not 
expecting to see substantial volatility in health insurers written premiums, expenses or 
loss ratios over time. Furthermore, relative-size measure captures health insurers’ product 
risk better than relative-weight measure. Relative-weight risk measure is most effective 
when product risk levels differ substantially as they do for life, annuities and health 
insurance products of life insurers. Product risk level of health insurers is more 
homogeneous. As we have argued, when measuring life insurers’ product risk, health 
insurance policies are products with higher risk levels compared to life insurance and 
annuities. Therefore, the overall product risk of health insurers is comparatively high 
compared to life insurers. On an already high product risk level platform, relative-weight 
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risk measure is not capable of capturing different product risk levels of each line of 
business well. However, relative-size risk measure tells clearly how much product risk 
there is in each line of business. Specifically, we measure health insurers’ product risk by 
premium income scaled by insurers’ total assets for each line of business. Table 1.4 
shows the summary statistics for each line of health insurers’ business.  
Table 1.4 Summary Statistics for the Ratio of Health Insurers' Premiums to Total 
Assets, by Product Line * 
  2005   2006 
Variable N P1 Median P3 Mean Stdev  N P1 Median P3 Mean Stdev 
Comprehensive 446 0.978 1.816 2.841 2.042 1.553  451 0.931 1.771 2.814 1.967 1.467 
FEHPs 154 0.074 0.198 0.341 0.299 0.447  158 0.084 0.194 0.325 0.311 0.511 
Medicare 217 0.13 0.570 1.571 1.184 1.812  257 0.201 0.728 1.742 1.250 1.557 
MediGap 103 0.033 0.074 0.146 0.121 0.161  103 0.022 0.068 0.132 0.105 0.140 
Medicaid 178 0.364 1.569 3.401 2.154 2.443  178 0.338 1.682 3.053 2.052 2.023 
Dental 222 0.056 1.111 2.893 1.903 2.425  237 0.046 0.973 2.667 1.834 2.421 
Vision 60 0.002 0.033 0.986 0.736 1.155  59 0.002 0.037 1.083 0.846 1.433 
Other  52 0.044 0.171 0.951 0.706 1.159  103 0.027 0.141 0.550 1.785 11.671 
  2007  2008 
Variable N P1 Median P3 Mean Stdev  N P1 Median P3 Mean Stdev 
Comprehensive 441 0.892 1.677 2.579 1.851 1.280  445 0.827 1.579 2.550 1.833 1.341 
FEHPs 162 0.076 0.179 0.322 0.287 0.391  164 0.079 0.191 0.370 0.288 0.353 
Medicare 297 0.189 0.775 1.905 1.401 1.944  338 0.177 0.785 2.185 1.424 1.759 
MediGap 107 0.017 0.061 0.130 0.114 0.209  109 0.018 0.060 0.118 0.113 0.211 
Medicaid 176 0.354 1.597 3.001 1.960 1.786  183 0.510 1.588 3.318 1.983 1.766 
Dental 237 0.040 0.843 2.628 1.686 2.287  236 0.041 0.900 2.654 1.720 2.402 
Vision 67 0.002 0.020 1.028 0.754 1.248  73 0.003 0.021 1.130 0.888 1.580 
Other  150 0.020 0.066 0.319 0.408 0.903   145 0.022 0.065 0.367 0.495 1.059 
* Summary statistics for a given product line exclude insurers that records 0 premiums in the line.  
Here we have proposed relative-size exposure-based risk measure to quantify 
health insurers’ product risk. In Chapter 2 Section 2.2, we will examine health insurers’ 
products in a more extensive way to classify major products into groups and formally 
introduce product risk proxies for health insurers. 
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1.2 Other Enterprise Risks of Life and Health Insurers 
1.2.1 Other Enterprise Risks and Proxies  
Other Enterprise Risks 
 Enterprise risk is the broad spectrum of risks that an enterprise faces.  The 
Casualty Actuarial Society Enterprise Risk Management Committee classified the major 
enterprise risks for a prototypical manufacturing firm into four groups: hazard risk, 
financial risk, operational risk, and strategic risk.20 Hazard risk is the risk of loss caused 
by unexpected external reasons such as fire, personal injury, and property damage caused 
by natural perils, etc. Financial risk refers to uncertainties on enterprise’s assets and cash 
flow caused by exposures to market risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, and interest rate risk. 
Operational risk is defined as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events”.21 In other words, operational risk 
is embedded in daily business operations. It can be, for instance, supply chain 
management failure, legal risk, or even inaccurate information because of wrong data 
input causing economic losses. For strategic risk, we did not find a formal definition. 
Casualty Actuarial Society Enterprise Risk Management Committee listed: “reputational 
damage, competition, customer wants, demographical and social/cultural trends, 
technological innovation, capital availability, and regulatory and political trends” as 
sources of strategic risk.  
                                                          
20 “Overview of Enterprise Risk Management”, Casualty Actuarial Society Enterprise Risk Management 
Committee, May 2003. 
21 “Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision of Operational Risk”, Bank for International 
Settlement:  Basel Committee Publications No. 96.  2003 
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 In enterprise risk management, some risks can be avoided, some risks need to be 
transferred, and some risks have to be managed. Firms can transfer hazard risk by 
purchasing insurance. Operational risk can be reduced by improving production process 
design and employee training. Part of the financial risk can be hedged using derivatives 
and diversification but not the entire financial risk exposure especially for financial 
industries. So financial risk and strategic risk are types of risks firms have to manage. For 
our study on insurers, we focus on financial risk and strategic risk.  
Measures for Major Enterprise Risks 
 It is useful to review the major features of an insurer’s structure and business 
operations before discussing measures.  An insurance company manages two interrelated 
businesses: products and assets. The product side covers insurance business and the asset 
side is responsible for asset management. Insurance companies’ core business is to 
underwrite insurance policies. Insurers can choose different organizational forms and 
distribution channels to facilitate their product focus. 22 There are two main types of 
organizational forms: stock and mutual. The difference between stock and mutual 
insurers is the ownership. Mutual insurers are owned by policyholders. 23  For stock 
insurers, owners and policyholders are different. The distribution system is the method by 
which insurers market their products. The major distribution channels are brokers, agents 
                                                          
22  For property/liability insurance industry, Regan and Tzeng (1999) studied how insurers choose 
organizational form and distribution system simultaneously after product focus selection. For life insurance 
industry, Baranoff and Sager (2003) connected the study of life insurers’ capital and risk decisions together 
with organizational form and distribution system.  
23 The two organizational forms are applicable to life and property/casualty insurers. Health insurers have 
more types of organizational forms such as non-profit, BC/BS, reciprocal, etc. 
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and direct sales. On the asset side, one major function of insurance companies is to invest 
collected premiums and generate investment income. In fact, insurance companies are 
important financial market makers. Insurers’ major investment asset classes include 
bonds, stocks, mortgages, real estate, and short-term investments. By the end of 2008, the 
life insurance industry’s total assets amounted to $4.6 trillion, bond holdings for the 
whole life insurance industry amounted to $2.2 trillion, and common stocks were 
approximately $104 billion.24 The insurers’ responsibility is not only to allocate assets 
into different classes, but also to monitor and timely adjust the asset portfolio risk so that 
duration and convexity of asset portfolio on the asset side match insurers’ liabilities 
generated from their product side. 
 Underwriting and asset management activities carry financial and strategic risk. 
Insurers’ NAIC annual filings provide detailed information on underwriting and asset 
management activity. Using these data, we quantify insurers’ major risk exposure such as 
product risk and asset risk in regular business operations. These risk measures facilitate 
further analysis on insurers’ risk-taking behavior and risk management strategies. 
In the following paragraph we discuss existing measures for asset risk. Next, we 
discuss organizational form and group affiliation, factors related to strategic risk.  
 There are two existing methods to proxy asset risk. One is exposure oriented, the 
other one is market risk oriented. The exposure oriented method is based on the risk-
based capital rule for financial industries. Specifically, it assigns penalty weights to 
                                                          
24 Data source is NAIC life insurer’s annual filing, and numbers are in book value.  
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different classes of assets in the asset portfolio. If the majority of an asset portfolio is 
invested in low-quality risky assets, the asset risk will be high. The exposure oriented 
method focuses on the allocation of the asset portfolio. In the banking industry, Shrieves 
and Dahl (1992), Berger (1995) and Jacques and Nigro (1997) used this method to proxy 
asset risk. In the insurance industry, Baranoff and Sager (2002 and 2003), Baranoff, 
Papadopoulos and Sager (2007) applied this method to the life insurance industry. One 
disadvantage of the exposure oriented method is its temporal inflexibility, for the 
weighting formula is fixed and time-invariant inherited from the fixed risk-based capital 
weights. As the relative risks of the various asset classes change in the market, the 
weights remain the same. The market risk oriented method overcomes that particular 
weakness. Baranoff, Papadopoulos and Sager (2007) introduced a market risk oriented 
method to proxy life insurers’ asset risk, which they called the opportunity asset risk 
(OAR). Like asset risk in finance, their method measures asset risk by volatility of 
portfolio return. Since the actual returns of the life insurer portfolio are not available, they 
used an appropriate corresponding market index return to proxy the life insurer return for 
each asset class as a whole. In each month, the return of each asset class is computed by 
multiplying the corresponding market index returns for each asset class by the initial 
asset value of each asset class. Then the asset portfolio return is calculated as the sum of 
asset returns of all asset classes. This computation is performed for each of the twelve 
months of each year. OAR for a year is then computed as the standard deviation of the 
twelve months’ returns in that year. As we mentioned already, this methodology partially 
overcomes the mark-to-market issue of insurers’ asset by using up-to-date market 
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indices.25 More importantly, it updates asset risk with timely market change information, 
which captures the asset risk dynamics better.  
 Stock and mutual are the two most common organizational forms for insurance 
companies. In a stock insurance company, there are three major stakeholders in the firm: 
policyholders, owners, and managers.26 For mutual insurers, there are only two major 
stakeholders, policyholders/owners and managers. A difference in organizational form 
could affect insurers’ business strategy decisions and strategic risk for the following 
possible reasons. First, mutual insurers have less supervision or control over managers 
than stock insurers, and less control might encourage managers to exercise managerial 
discretion more in their own interests. Managerial discretion is a type of agency cost 
introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Mayers and Smith (1982 and 1987) found 
that mutual insurers are more successful in lines of business requiring less managerial 
discretion, such as standardized products, whereas stock insurers are more successful in 
more risky or individualized products. Mutual insurers are owned by diversified 
policyholders and the control rights over the management team are not as strong as stock 
insurers. So managers of mutual insurers have more opportunities for managerial 
discretion. However, standardized or less risky products could limit managerial discretion, 
which can relieve this problem for mutual insurers. Second, stock insurers might have 
more financing channels than mutual insurers, which might also affect the cost of capital. 
                                                          
25 Market value of asset is only required to be reported for stock insurers. 
26 The relationship between policyholders and equity holders in stock insurance companies are similar to 
bond holders and equity holders in a non-financial firm. Equity holders only have the right of residual 
claimant.    
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For example, public insurers can simply raise funds by issuing equities. Different means 
of financing will affect insurers’ business strategies and strategic risks.            
 Whether an insurer is affiliated with the other insurers or whether an insurer is a 
group member of an insurance group or insurance holding company also affects strategic 
risk. As a group member, an insurer can take advantage of the greater access to financing 
resources of the group, more distribution channels or networking in bigger geographical 
areas and spillover benefit of group reputation. Financing resources within an insurance 
group or insurance holding company is called internal capital market, which is a topic in 
conglomerate firms study in finance. Empirical research has not confirmed the effect of 
internal market on conglomerate firms’ investment strategies even though the internal 
market does exist. In insurance industries, Powell, Sommer and Eckles (2008) studied 
internal capital market activities in the property liability insurance industry. They found 
that internal capital market affected investment behavior of affiliated insurers. 
1.2.2 Life Insurers’ Enterprise Risks   
Features of Life Insurers’ Enterprise Risks 
 We have discussed some of insurers’ major enterprise risks and presented some 
proxies. In this section, we apply those proxies to insurer data to begin our empirical 
analysis.  
 To study life insurers’ asset risk, we first examine life insurers’ asset allocation. 
Figure 1.2 displays life insurers’ asset allocation in 16 asset classes in 2008. The 
31 
 
percentage of each asset type is calculated as the total amount of investment in a certain 
type of asset for the entire life insurance industry, divided by total invested assets of the 
entire life insurance industry in each year. More than 50% of invested assets were in high 
quality corporate bonds, whereas stocks (both common and preferred) accounted for only 
5.77%. Table 1.5 records life insurers’ asset allocation in each of the 16 asset classes 
from 2005 to 2008.  




Table 1.5 Life Insurers' Invested Asset Portfolio Allocation 2005 - 2008 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 
Government bonds (<= 1 year)  $17,382,079,944   $21,245,497,300   $18,974,250,835   $48,852,301,468  
Government bonds (1 to <= 5 year)  $40,695,893,677   $37,481,406,031   $29,878,239,324   $33,079,559,090  
Government bonds (5 to <= 10 year)  $52,473,082,188   $42,642,409,833   $32,906,054,077   $36,599,713,765  
Government bonds (10 to <= 20 year)  $49,798,980,709   $45,455,080,797   $47,077,010,937   $47,458,342,304  
Government bonds (> 20 year)  $39,433,281,181   $38,408,307,783   $38,033,440,597   $45,678,417,053  
High quality municipal bonds  $297,846,955,543   $298,643,190,551   $287,429,426,024   $294,823,481,563  
Low quality municipal bonds  $140,926,142   $81,025,634   $170,634,303   $361,489,661  
Utility bonds (all classes 1-6)  $145,651,586,918   $144,799,032,862   $145,301,910,758   $157,516,755,112  
Corporate bonds (class 1, 2)  $1,433,816,600,000   $1,451,829,400,000   $1,509,360,500,000   $1,472,778,800,000  
Corporate bonds (class 3)  $65,036,773,279   $59,525,273,385   $64,019,575,467   $72,963,355,313  
Corporate bonds (class 4)  $33,889,492,678   $38,873,220,888   $35,766,014,036   $36,928,042,471  
Corporate bonds (class 5, 6)  $10,665,182,029   $9,443,853,395   $13,587,124,328   $21,606,912,319  
Stock  $150,835,106,762   $196,775,887,624   $200,593,517,076   $168,826,820,623  
Mortgages  $276,462,626,485   $293,976,121,104   $315,053,282,265   $328,011,067,462  
Real Estate  $13,735,125,434   $13,063,028,038   $13,678,159,512   $14,139,409,800  
Cash and short-term investments  $60,987,957,911   $79,620,660,589   $78,954,937,437   $146,811,308,717  
Cash and total invested assets  $2,688,851,650,880   $2,771,863,395,814   $2,830,784,076,976   $2,926,435,776,721  
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Using the asset risk proxy method described in the previous section, we calculated 
opportunity asset risk (OAR) for each life insurer. Table 1.6 presents summary statistics 
for OAR scaled by total assets of each insurer. We can see that life insurers’ asset risks 
jumped in 2008 both in magnitude and standard deviation. It shows that OAR is a 
powerful measure to capture market risk of insurers’ asset portfolios.   
Table 1.6 Life Insurers' OAR Scaled by Invested 
Assets 
  P1 Median P3 Mean Stdev 
2005 0.0017 0.0019 0.0033 0.0030 0.0027 
2006 0.0019 0.0021 0.0023 0.0026 0.0020 
2007 0.0017 0.0025 0.0046 0.0039 0.0040 
2008 0.0028 0.0037 0.0055 0.0059 0.0078 
 
 Examining life insurers’ organizational forms and in-group status, we found that 
the majority of life insurers are formed as stock insurers. Also, most of them are members 
of affiliated groups. Table 1.7 summarizes these two proxies for the whole industry from 
2005 to 2008.  
Table 1.7 Life Insurers' Organizational Form and In Group Status 
  N Stock Insurers Group Members 
2005 941 868 706 
2006 905 836 679 
2007 853 792 637 






Life Insurers’ Enterprise Risks and Product Types 
 In the product risk section, we discussed life insurers’ major lines of business (life 
insurance, annuities, health insurance, and reinsurance) and the inherent differences in the 
underlying risk levels of these lines. In the life insurance literature, Baranoff and Sager 
(2003) introduced the business strategy hypothesis, which treats product specialization or 
choice of product mix as a predeterminant of other major business decisions, including 
other enterprise risks. It is reasonable that product risk should interact with the other 
enterprise risks. So we would like to examine whether the enterprise risks as proxied 
indeed vary with product specialization. Following Baranoff and Sager (2003), we 
classify each individual insurer as one of five types of insurers: annuities specialized, life 
insurance specialized, health insurance specialized, reinsurance specialized, and 
combination insurers. For each insurer, we calculate the proportion of total premiums 
obtained from each of the four lines of business (life insurance, annuities, health 
insurance, and reinsurance) and classify an insurer as a product specialist if more than 
70% of its premiums are obtained from one line. For instance, if a life insurer has more 
than 70% of its premium writings from annuities, this life insurer is classified as annuities 
specialized. For insurers not specialized in any product type, we classify them into the 
combination group. In this way, we created five specialized groups and an insurer’s 
group identity might change from year to year depending on its major premium writing 
resource. Then we examine enterprise risk proxies again for each group in each year.  
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 First, we inspect life insurers’ asset allocation. Figure 1.3 on the following page 
shows asset allocation for the five specialized groups. From this graph, life insurers with 
different product specializations do not show substantial difference on asset allocation. 
Reinsurance specialized insurers allocated more in stocks. Health and reinsurance 










 For each product specialized group, we calculated summary statistics for the asset 
risk proxy OAR scaled by total assets. Table 1.8 shows the summary statistic for all five 
groups from 2005 to 2008. Reinsurance specialized insurers have the highest asset risk 
throughout years, while annuities specialized insurers maintain the lowest asset risk. Life 
and health specialized insurers have medium asset risk. And asset risks go up in 2008 for 
all groups.   
Table 1.8 Life Insurers' OAR Scaled by Invested Assets by Products 
  Annuities    Life 
 Median Mean Stdev   Median Mean Stdev 
2005 0.0017 0.0020 0.0017  2005 0.0020 0.0032 0.0030 
2006 0.0020 0.0020 0.0003  2006 0.0020 0.0025 0.0021 
2007 0.0018 0.0025 0.0030  2007 0.0027 0.0040 0.0038 
2008 0.0033 0.0040 0.0058  2008 0.0036 0.0057 0.0076 
         
  Health    Reinsurance 
 Median Mean Stdev   Median Mean Stdev 
2005 0.0023 0.0030 0.0022  2005 0.0029 0.0044 0.0041 
2006 0.0022 0.0025 0.0017  2006 0.0022 0.0035 0.0035 
2007 0.0028 0.0037 0.0032  2007 0.0040 0.0060 0.0064 
2008 0.0042 0.0055 0.0060  2008 0.0044 0.0097 0.0144 
         
  Combination      
 Median Mean Stdev      
2005 0.0019 0.0027 0.0020      
2006 0.0021 0.0024 0.0014      
2007 0.0025 0.0037 0.0036      





 We also compare organizational form and group affiliation of insurers in different 
product specialization and results are in Table 1.9. For all product specialization groups, 
majority of insurers are stock insurers and have some group affiliation. Reinsurance 
specialized insurers are almost all stock insurers.  
Table 1.9 Life Insurers' Organizational Form and In Group 
Status by Products 
  Annuities    Life 
 N Stock  Group   N Stock Group 
2005 106 99 95  2005 269 245 178 
2006 97 91 87  2006 256 238 172 
2007 84 79 77  2007 247 230 163 
2008* 96 90 84  2008* 237 220 156 
         
  Health    Reinsurance 
 N Stock  Group   N Stock  Group 
2005 185 168 144  2005 104 104 71 
2006 180 163 140  2006 105 105 69 
2007 174 164 136  2007 94 94 62 
2008* 172 160 136  2008* 92 91 61 
         
  Combination  
* In 2008, 61 firms had 0 or negative 
premium writings, and they are left out 
this counting. 
 N Stock  Group      
2005 277 252 218      
2006 267 239 211      
2007 254 225 119      







1.2.3 Health Insurers’ Enterprise Risks  
U.S. Healthcare Delivery System 
In the U.S. healthcare delivery system, health insurers are financial intermediaries. 
Money flows from consumers/patients/employers to health care providers through health 
insurers. As a result, health insurers have developed a role as managers of access to 
health care through their ability to approve or to disapprove payment for services. Health 
insurers take a variety of organizational structures: profit and non-profit; mutual and 
stock (most of which are not publicly traded), as well as Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
(BC/BS). Also, the healthcare delivery system is characterized by managed care, which 
was designed to save medical expenses. HMO, PPO and POS are popular networks and 
organizations that deliver healthcare and medical services through managed care.27 In 
HMO networks, subscribers have greater restrictions on their choices of providers and 
services than in other arrangements and patients need primary care physicians’ reference 
to see specialists (gatekeeper). On the other hand, PPO networks provide flexible choices 
regarding providers and medical services and there is no gatekeeper. Therefore, PPO 
plans are usually more expensive for consumers than HMO plans.   
Before the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010, the evolution 
of the U.S. health care system excluded more than 50 million Americans from coverage 
for various reasons.28 The excluded group has not been part of the managed care system 
                                                          
27 HMO: Health Maintenance Organization; PPO: Preferred Provider Organization; POS: Point of Service, 
can be either HMO or PPO.  
28 By the end of 2009, there were 50.7 million uninsured people in the U.S. Income, Poverty and Health 
Insurance Coverage in the United States 2009, US Census of Bureau, September 2010 
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and has used the health care system mostly on an emergency basis without discounts. 
Traditionally, U.S. regulation of insurers has been in the domain of the states, rather than 
the Federal government. State regulation has emphasized insurer solvency and consumer 
protection and arranged for guarantee funds, which provide payment for the claims of 
insolvent insurers. Reimbursement limits for guarantee funds are set by each state and 
vary from $100,000 to $500,000 per claimant.29 
PPACA brings the uninsured population into the system and the Federal 
government plays a larger regulatory and participatory role. The states still regulate the 
health insurance industry within the requirements of the new law (yet to be completely 
clarified). 30 The consumer group grows with the addition of the formerly uninsured. 
Persons with pre-existing conditions are expected to flow into high risk pools subsidized 
by the Federal government and implemented by the states and the Federal government.  
Since PPACA mandates coverage for all, Exchanges are planned to insure persons 
otherwise lacking easy access to the system. Under PPACA, the health insurance industry 
retains its position as financial intermediary and the “holder” of the managed care 




                                                          
29 See “NOLHGA, the Life and Health Insurance Guaranty System, and the Financial Crisis of 2008-2009” 
by Peter G. Gallanis, June 5, NY, NY at the American Bar Association Tort Trial & Insurance Practice 
Session. 
30 The detailed implementation of PPACA evolves daily, and is not discussed here. 
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Features of Health Insurers’ Enterprise Risks 
Like other insurers, health insurers need to manage product risk and asset risk 
under different organizational forms. However, health insurers’ enterprise risks have 
some distinctive attributes because health insurers are underwriting highly risky health 
insurance products in the complex healthcare delivery system. First, health insurers need 
to have good control over their asset risk. On the one hand, a high level of product risk 
may put more pressure on health insurers’ asset risk management. On the other hand, 
health insurers need to make payments to healthcare providers once medical services are 
provided. For this purpose, health insurers have a high volume of cash flows in and out. 
Therefore, high quality liquid assets compose a major part of health insurers’ asset 
portfolios. Second, health insurers manage the majority of health insurance policies 
through managed care. From the most restrictive HMO to the most flexible PPO, 
different managed care networks actually carry different levels of risk to health insurers. 
With more restriction and control over medical services provided, HMO type plans 
eliminate more uncertainties in the insurance contract and thereby reduce health insurers’ 
loss exposures. On the other hand, PPO type plans keep more uncertainties by providing 
more flexibility to policyholders, which increases insurers’ loss exposures.  
In the following, we will first examine health insurers’ asset risks, organizational 
forms, group affiliations, and managed care networks or plan types. Then we will inspect 
different asset risks, organizational forms, and group affiliation status for different groups 
of insurers focusing on certain managed care networks. Finally we will check the same 
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set of risk proxies further for different groups of insurers focusing on different health 
insurer products.  
  Figure 1.4 displays health insurers’ collective invested asset allocation in 2008. 
Compared with Figure 1.2 (life insurers’ collective invested asset allocation in 2008), 
Figure 1.4 shows that health insurers hold relatively more high quality instruments and 
more liquid instruments. They hold almost no mortgage and real estate and about half of 
the government bonds in the portfolio have less than one year maturity. The asset 
allocation profile matches features of health insurers’ businesses as we discussed above.    





OAR (opportunity asset risk – a volatility-based asset risk measure) scaled by total 
invested assets is shown in Table 1.10. We do not see much variation in OAR from year 
to year even during the financial crisis of 2008. 
 
Table 1.10 Health Insurers' OAR Scaled by Total 
Invested Assets 2005 – 2008 
  P1 Median P3 Mean Stdev 
2005 0.0019 0.0026 0.0056 0.0046 0.0050 
2006 0.0021 0.0029 0.0052 0.0043 0.0045 
2007 0.0022 0.0037 0.0054 0.0046 0.0046 
2008 0.0023 0.0035 0.0055 0.0045 0.0037 
 
 Table 1.11 shows health insurers’ organizational forms and group affiliations. The 
majority of health insurers are still organized as stock insurers and have certain group 
affiliations, but the percentage is not as high as life insurers shown in table 1.7.   
Table 1.11 Health Insurers' Organizational Form and In 
Group Status 
  N Stock Insurers Group Members 
2005 828 607 555 
2006 876 645 585 
2007 870 640 586 
2008 881 654 613 
 
 Each health insurance contract comes with a specific plan type. Table 1.12 shows 
covered members in each type of plan from 2005 to 2008. Membership in HMO plans 
decreased, while membership in PPO plans increased. HMO and PPO plans account for 
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the majority of health insurance contracts. Indemnity plans, which are just the traditional 
fee-for-service type contracts instead of managed care plans, decreased as well. 
 
Table 1.12 Insured Members by Plan Type* 
























   
9,221,476  
     
9,691,149  
PSO 
    
2,277,637  
   
1,781,108  
      
527,325  









   
14,434,015  
* HMO: Health Maintenance Organization;  
   PPO: Preferred Provider Organization;  
   POS: Point of Service (HMO or PPO);  
   PSO: Patient Safety Organization;  
   Indemnity: Fee for Service  
 
Health Insurers’ Enterprise Risks and Plan Type 
 As we discussed previously, different plan types may contribute to riskiness of 
health insurance contracts. We wonder whether insurers’ maintain certain asset risks in 
response to plan types. Specifically, we classify each insurer into different plan type 
concentration groups. For example, if the majority (here we use the cutoff point of 70%) 
of an insurer’s plans are HMO plans, then we classify this insurer as HMO concentrated. 
If an insurer has none of the plan types above 70%, we classify this insurer as 
combination type. Then we study asset risk, organizational form and group affiliation for 
various plan concentration groups. 
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 Figure 1.5 displays the asset allocations of different plan concentration groups. 
The percentage of each asset class is calculated as total amount invested in the specific 
asset class divided by total invested assets for each plan concentration group as an 
aggregate. Figure 1.5 shows that asset portfolio allocations across groups resemble Figure 
1.3. The indemnity group is highly invested in stocks in 2008. PPO, PSO and Indemnity 
groups experienced negative cash flow in 2008. HMO groups held the highest weight of 
cash compared with the other groups.  
Figure 1.5 Health Insurers’ Invested Asset Portfolio Allocation by Plan Type in 2008 
 
Table 1.13 presents asset risk proxy OAR scaled by invested assets for different plan 
groups. The HMO concentrated group maintains the lowest asset risk, whereas the 
Indemnity group has the highest asset risk and the PPO group has the second highest 
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asset risk. Interestingly, asset risk across groups decreased in 2008 for all groups except 
for HMO group.  
Table 1.13 Health Insurers' OAR Scaled by Invested Assets by Plan Type  
  HMO     PPO 
 Median Mean Stdev   Median Mean Stdev 
2005 0.0024 0.0039 0.0048  2005 0.0042 0.0058 0.0047 
2006 0.0026 0.0035 0.0031  2006 0.0046 0.0059 0.0057 
2007 0.0032 0.0038 0.0026  2007 0.0047 0.0063 0.0063 
2008 0.0029 0.0041 0.0032  2008 0.0040 0.0054 0.0043 
         
  POS    PSO 
 Median Mean Stdev   Median Mean Stdev 
2005 0.0029 0.0053 0.0059  2005 0.0051 0.0055 0.0049 
2006 0.0034 0.0045 0.0043  2006 0.0056 0.0051 0.0034 
2007 0.0033 0.0045 0.0039  2007 0.0066 0.0135 0.0179 
2008 0.0026 0.0033 0.0019  2008 0.0063 0.0071 0.0076 
         
  Indemnity    Combination 
 Median Mean Stdev   Median Mean Stdev 
2005 0.0053 0.0074 0.0067  2005 0.0030 0.0052 0.0051 
2006 0.0054 0.0073 0.0079  2006 0.0037 0.0052 0.0049 
2007 0.0046 0.0056 0.0044  2007 0.0044 0.0054 0.0055 
2008 0.0039 0.0058 0.0047   2008 0.0035 0.0047 0.0039 
 
 Table 1.14 shows the number of insurers in each plan concentration group, 
organizational form and group affiliation. The majority of insurers are in HMO plan 






Table 1.14 Health Insurers' Organizational Form and In Group Status by Plan Type* 
  HMO     PPO 
 N Stock  Group   N Stock Group 
2005 425 351 300  2005 69 37 47 
2006 436 353 304  2006 76 37 48 
2007 407 328 281  2007 87 50 60 
2008 419 338 294  2008 85 49 60 
         
  POS    PSO 
 N Stock  Group   N Stock  Group 
2005 33 24 20  2005 10 6 2 
2006 30 23 19  2006 8 4 3 
2007 27 21 16  2007 9 6 4 
2008 29 23 17  2008 8 6 3 
         
  Indemnity    Combination 
 N Stock  Group   N Stock  Group 
2005 23 11 12  2005 203 131 140 
2006 28 15 15  2006 206 131 140 
2007 23 13 13  2007 218 134 153 
2008 24 12 15   2008 218 142 157 
* Some insurers did not report plan types in certain years. There are 65, 92, 99, and 98 such insurers in 
2005 to 2008. 
 
Health Insurers’ Enterprise Risks and Product Types 
 In the product risk section, we analyzed risk levels of health insurers’ products. 
We considered the variation of asset risk, organizational form and group affiliation of 
health insurers by product specializations. Paralleling our partitioning of the life 
insurance industry by product specialization, we now partition health insurers by product 
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specialization based upon the percentage of premium income in each line of business or 
product. We again use 70% as the cutoff point for assignment to product specialization.31  
 Figure 1.6 displays asset allocation by product specialization for health insurers in 
2008. Vision specialized insurers have made the greatest investment in stocks in 2008 
and their cash flow and short-term investments ended up to be negative.32  
 
                                                          
31 The number of insurers included in each product specialization group can be found in table 16. 
32 A number of large insurers specialized in vision experienced negative cash and short-term investment in 
accounting in 2008. Those insurers have a large exposure in stock investment.  
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Table 1.15 shows calculated OAR scaled by invested assets as the asset risk measure for 
different product specialization groups. Medicare and MediGap groups and other health 
product groups (Disability, Prescription Drug, and Long Term Care) have comparatively 
larger asset risks.  
Table 1.15 Health Insurers' OAR Scaled by Invested Assets by Product Specialization 
  Combination     Comprehensive & FEHPs* 
 Median Mean Stdev   Median Mean Stdev 
2005 0.0024 0.0045 0.0048  2005 0.0027 0.0049 0.0051 
2006 0.0032 0.0039 0.0025  2006 0.0029 0.0049 0.0052 
2007 0.0028 0.0035 0.0023  2007 0.0035 0.0047 0.0043 
2008 0.0025 0.0036 0.0041  2008 0.0028 0.0043 0.0034 
         
  Dental    Medicaid 
 Median Mean Stdev   Median Mean Stdev 
2005 0.0026 0.0045 0.0052  2005 0.0026 0.0037 0.0032 
2006 0.0029 0.0042 0.0051  2006 0.0029 0.0039 0.0039 
2007 0.0042 0.0048 0.0043  2007 0.0037 0.0041 0.0031 
2008 0.0040 0.0046 0.0035  2008 0.0043 0.0046 0.0031 
         
  Medicare & MediGap**    Other Health 
 Median Mean Stdev   Median Mean Stdev 
2005 0.0034 0.0051 0.0083  2005 0.0049 0.0043 0.0021 
2006 0.0025 0.0035 0.0030  2006 0.0031 0.0046 0.0038 
2007 0.0040 0.0052 0.0074  2007 0.0051 0.0051 0.0030 
2008 0.0052 0.0054 0.0039  2008 0.0053 0.0060 0.0055 
         
  Vision  * Comprehensive and FEHPs are combined as 
one type of product type since there are only a 
few insurers specialized in FEHPs. **Medicare 
and MediGap are combined as one type of 
product since there are only a couple of insurers 
specialized in MediGap.                               
 Median Mean Stdev  
2005 0.0024 0.0038 0.0030  
2006 0.0048 0.0048 0.0028  
2007 0.0050 0.0056 0.0059  





Table 1.16 displays health insurers’ organizational forms and group affiliations by 
product specializations. More insurers are in Medicare and MediGap specialized group in 
recent years. Almost all product specialization groups have the majority of insurers as 
stock insurers except the vision specialized group. 
Table 1.16 Health Insurers' Organizational Form and In Group Status by Product 
Specialization* 
  Combination     Comprehensive & FEHPs 
 N Stock  Group   N Stock Group 
2005 93 73 62  2005 346 244 269 
2006 84 64 57  2006 365 255 281 
2007 78 56 53  2007 340 234 261 
2008 88 64 63  2008 325 226 250 
         
  Dental    Medicaid 
 N Stock  Group   N Stock  Group 
2005 149 113 81  2005 88 70 54 
2006 148 111 87  2006 87 66 56 
2007 148 110 91  2007 88 67 61 
2008 143 107 89  2008 91 70 62 
         
  Medicare & MediGap    Other Health 
 N Stock  Group   N Stock  Group 
2005 47 42 30  2005 15 10 8 
2006 51 44 28  2006 24 14 9 
2007 66 60 33  2007 30 21 13 
2008 93 85 58  2008 27 18 13 
         
  Vision  * There are some insurers with 0 or negative 
premium income in each year. They are excluded 
from these tallies. They number 63, 87, 92, and 
88 from year 2005 to 2008. 
 N Stock  Group  
2005 27 13 17  
2006 30 16 16  
2007 28 13 17      





1.3 Insurers’ Risk Management by Capital and Hedging 
1.3.1 Insurers’ Risk Management Tools  
 Reinsurance, derivative hedging and capital are some of insurers’ major risk 
management tools. Reinsurance and derivative hedging are risk reduction tools, while 
capital is a risk mitigation tool and it is usually used as a resort to buffer unexpected 
losses caused by insurers’ underwriting or asset management. Here, we focus on capital 
and derivative hedging.   
“Reinsurance is a contractual agreement under which an insurer secures coverage 
from a reinsurer for a potential loss to which it is exposed under insurance policies issued 
to original insureds.” 33  Essentially, reinsurance is insuring insurance contracts. 
Reinsurance is a longstanding and common risk reduction practice for insurers. 34  
However, in recent years, reinsurance business in the U.S. has been declining in the life 
insurance industry.35  
On the other hand, derivatives hedging have become more popular. By the end of 
2010, the notional amount of over-the-counter derivatives held by the insurance industry 
totaled $850.4 billion 36 . Life insurers are primary users of derivative instruments, 
representing 93.4% of the total notional amount for the whole insurance industry 
                                                          
33 “Understanding Reinsurance”, David M. Rain and Joy L. Langford, New Appleman Insurance Law 
Practice Guide, Mathew Bender & Company 2007. 
34 In fact the first independent professional reinsurance company, Cologne Re. was founded in 1842. “A 
Brief History of Reinsurance”, David M. Holland, Reinsurance News, February 2009, Issue 65. 
35 In life reinsurance business, U.S. recurring life reinsurance ceded fell again from $724.2 billion in 2006 
to $682.9 billion in 2007.  Life Reinsurance Data from the Munich American Survey, David M. 
Bruggeman, Reinsurance News, August 2008, Issue No. 63. 
36 According to the definition of  Chicago Mercentile Exchange (CME) group, ‘notional value’ refers to the 
underlying value (face value) of the financial instrument or commodity specified in a futures or options on 
a futures contract.  
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including life/health, property-liability and health insurance industries. 37  Indeed, 
derivative instruments are more versatile and flexible risk management tools compared to 
reinsurance especially for life insurers. Life insurers can use derivatives to hedge various 
financial risks directly or create synthetic asset.38 More importantly, derivative hedging is 
a critical tool for life insurers to hedge financial risk exposure caused by guarantees of 
VAGB products when reinsurance capacity dries up. In fact, hedging programs saved the 
industry about $40 billion during the rapid equity market declines of September and 
October of 2008.39   
Insurers are required to hold a certain amount of capital. Capital is insurers’ first 
immediate resort when reserves fail to meet claims. The NAIC specifies the minimum 
amount (authorized control level) of capital that insurers must hold for the insurers’ level 
of asset risk, underwriting risk and business risk. This minimum is known as the risk-
based capital (RBC).40 However, prudent insurers usually keep much higher levels of 
capital than the RBC requirement. Reasons include the cost of financial distress, the high 
cost of refinancing and financial ratings concerns, which we will discuss in detail in the 
following literature review section. In fact, not only is the absolute value of capital 
important to insurers, but also the ratio of insurers’ capital to total assets – a ratio known 
as the capital ratio in the insurance industry. The capital ratio of insurers resembles the 
leverage or capital structure of firms in nonfinancial industries.  
                                                          
37 ‘Weekly Special Report of the NAIC’s Capital Market Bureau’, NAIC & Center for Insurance Policy and 
Research 
38 Synthetic asset is to take various positions to create the same effect as holding a certain asset or 
investment vehicle. For instance, life insurers use treasuries and credit default SWAP to replicate corporate 
bonds. 
39 ‘Responding to the Variable Annuity Crisis’, McKinsey Working Papers on Risk, McKinsey & 
Company, November 2010 
40 ‘Risk-Based Capital General Overview’, NAIC, July 15 2009 
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Even though reinsurance is an important method by which insurers transfer or 
manage risks, we focus on risk management by hedging and capital in this dissertation 
since one of our primary purposes is to inspect how insurers manage product risk, asset 
risk and the other enterprise risks using capital. Also, a number of life insurers rely on 
derivative instruments to hedge the new product risk created by guarantees for variable 
annuities. A major part of this dissertation is devoted to identifying and quantifying this 
new product risk and to examining how life insurers manage it. In the next section, we 
examine capital ratio and derivative applications for life and health insurers separately. 
Life Insurers’ Capital and Derivatives Activities 
 First we examine the capital ratio and derivatives activities for the whole life 
insurance industry. Table 1.17 presents summary statistics of life insurers’ capital ratios 
from 2005 – 2008. Life insurers’ mean and median capital ratio is stable across these 
years. Median capital ratio is consistently less than mean capital ratio, and the 
distribution of capital ratio is skewed to the right.  
Table 1.17 Life Insurers' Capital Ratio 2005 - 2008* 
Year P1 Median P3 Mean Stdev 
2005 0.087 0.201 0.492 0.312 0.277 
2006 0.088 0.202 0.491 0.315 0.281 
2007 0.089 0.203 0.483 0.314 0.281 
2008 0.085 0.205 0.540 0.340 0.310 
* Insurers with capital ratio below 0 or above 1 are excluded. 
 
 Table 1.18 lists the number of insurers in the life insurance industry (the number 
that report to the NAIC in the Life category) and number of life insurers active in 
derivative applications as of the year-end. The total number of life insurers decreased 
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from 2005 to 2008. The number of insurers with active derivatives transactions also 
decreased.  
Table 1.18 Number of Life Insurers Active in Derivatives 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 
# of Insurers 933 899 848 872 
# of Insurers using Derivatives 166 164 164 161 
 
 To inspect the capital ratio and derivatives activity strategies of insurers with 
different product specializations, we again assign each insurer to one specific product 
specialization if the insurer’s written premiums in a product type exceed 70% of total 
premiums. Table 1.19 shows capital ratio summary statistics for insurers with different 
product specializations. Annuity specialized insurers hold the minimum capital ratio 
throughout the years, while insurers specialized in reinsurance hold the highest capital 
ratio. Also, health insurance specialized insurers hold a high capital ratio. Table 1.20 
shows the number of life insurers in each product specialization and the number of 
insurers active in derivative transactions in each product specialization group. The table 
shows that most derivative users are annuity specialized insurers. Health insurance 







Table 1.19 Life Insurers' Capital Ratio by Product Specialization 
  Annuity     Combination 
  Median Mean Stdev    Median Mean Stdev 
2005 0.063 0.115 0.174  2005 0.164 0.273 0.250 
2006 0.061 0.108 0.157  2006 0.169 0.272 0.250 
2007 0.057 0.124 0.193  2007 0.164 0.274 0.251 
2008 0.063 0.116 0.176  2008 0.163 0.270 0.256 
         
 Health   Life 
  Median Mean Stdev    Median Mean Stdev 
2005 0.422 0.435 0.242  2005 0.166 0.279 0.275 
2006 0.388 0.403 0.232  2006 0.165 0.299 0.288 
2007 0.424 0.417 0.238  2007 0.169 0.284 0.283 
2008 0.428 0.415 0.237  2008 0.148 0.289 0.297 
         
 Reinsurance      
  Median Mean Stdev      
2005 0.488 0.487 0.311      
2006 0.523 0.504 0.337      
2007 0.417 0.479 0.340      
2008 0.424 0.473 0.338      
 
 
Table 1.20 Number of Life Insurers Active in Derivatives by Product Specialization 
Specialization   2005 2006 2007 2008* 
Annuity 
# of Insurers 106 96 84 96 
# of Insurers using Derivatives 49 52 47 52 
Combination 
# of Insurers 277 267 254 266 
# of Insurers using Derivatives 73 73 73 70 
Health 
# of Insurers 183 180 174 170 
# of Insurers using Derivatives 7 7 8 8 
Life 
# of Insurers 266 253 244 232 
# of Insurers using Derivatives 25 22 27 23 
Reinsurance 
# of Insurers 101 103 92 91 
# of Insurers using Derivatives 12 10 9 7 




Health Insurers’ Capital 
 For health insurers, we will study only capital as a risk management tool since 
very few health insurers are involved in derivative transactions. At the end of 2008, there 
were only 5 health insurers active in derivative transactions. First, we examine health 
insurers’ capital ratio for the whole industry. Table 1.21 presents the summary statistics 
for health insurers with capital ratios between 0 and 1. Compared to life insurers’ capital 
ratio (Table 1.17), health insurers hold relatively high capital ratios. High capital ratios 
are consistent with health insurers’ business focus. Health insurance products are riskier 
than life and annuity products. Also, health insurers’ cash flows move rapidly from 
policyholder to insurers to medical service providers.  
Table 1.21 Health Insurers' Capital Ratio* 
  N P1 Median P3 Mean Stdev 
2005 821 0.356 0.508 0.698 0.525 0.251 
2006 866 0.388 0.533 0.729 0.548 0.255 
2007 864 0.418 0.555 0.737 0.567 0.250 
2008 871 0.401 0.570 0.753 0.569 0.256 
* Insurers with capital ratio above 1 or less than 0 are excluded 
 
 Further, we also examine health insurers’ capital ratio in regard to health insurer’s 
product specializations and health insurance policy plan. Table 1.22 shows health 
insurers’ capital ratio by product specialization. Among all health products, dental and 
vision specialized insurers hold the highest capital ratios, whereas Medicare and 
Medicaid groups hold the lowest. This result does not accord with our expectation, since 
dental and vision insurance contracts just provide partial coverage, which is subject to 
upper limits, thus limiting the risk of dental and vision specialized insurers.  
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Table 1.22 Health Insurers' Capital Ratio by Product Specialization* 
Combination  Comprehensive & FEHPs 
Year N Median Mean Stdev  Year N Median Mean Stdev 
2005 93 0.396 0.407 0.155  2005 344 0.497 0.497 0.198 
2006 84 0.486 0.469 0.151  2006 361 0.517 0.516 0.198 
2007 78 0.516 0.505 0.155  2007 338 0.523 0.525 0.184 
2008 86 0.549 0.529 0.193  2008 324 0.529 0.527 0.199 
Dental  Medicaid 
Year N Median Mean Stdev  Year N Median Mean Stdev 
2005 149 0.720 0.649 0.271  2005 88 0.363 0.374 0.171 
2006 147 0.724 0.651 0.276  2006 87 0.395 0.422 0.162 
2007 147 0.719 0.662 0.252  2007 88 0.451 0.435 0.174 
2008 143 0.745 0.680 0.251  2008 88 0.415 0.430 0.164 
Medicare & MediGap  Other Health Products 
Year N Median Mean Stdev  Year N Median Mean Stdev 
2005 45 0.345 0.407 0.188  2005 15 0.586 0.532 0.348 
2006 48 0.394 0.375 0.224  2006 24 0.478 0.442 0.324 
2007 65 0.446 0.440 0.265  2007 30 0.491 0.503 0.334 
2008 90 0.471 0.487 0.254  2008 27 0.449 0.468 0.333 
Vision       
Year N Median Mean Stdev  * In each year some insurers are excluded 
because they experience negative or zero 
premium income. Such exclusions number 
60, 85 90, 88 in 2005 - 2008. 
2005 27 0.797 0.707 0.250  
2006 30 0.837 0.750 0.226  
2007 28 0.826 0.753 0.209  









Table 1.23 shows health insurers’ capital ratio by plan. Health insurers 
concentrated in indemnity plans hold about 0.1 higher capital ratios than other plans.  
Table 1.23 Health Insurers' Capital Ratio by Plan Type*  
Combination  HMO 
Year N Median Mean Stdev  Year N Median Mean Stdev 
2005 202 0.521 0.534 0.255  2005 423 0.457 0.465 0.206 
2006 204 0.560 0.568 0.255  2006 433 0.488 0.483 0.212 
2007 216 0.572 0.577 0.245  2007 405 0.506 0.503 0.212 
2008 217 0.598 0.593 0.243  2008 410 0.504 0.502 0.217 
Indemnity  POS 
Year N Median Mean Stdev  Year N Median Mean Stdev 
2005 23 0.666 0.656 0.181  2005 32 0.555 0.583 0.266 
2006 28 0.670 0.600 0.262  2006 29 0.541 0.598 0.229 
2007 23 0.646 0.666 0.245  2007 27 0.576 0.579 0.191 
2008 24 0.665 0.616 0.244  2008 29 0.634 0.623 0.225 
PPO  PSO 
Year N Median Mean Stdev  Year N Median Mean Stdev 
2005 69 0.560 0.554 0.245  2005 10 0.359 0.447 0.352 
2006 74 0.540 0.540 0.192  2006 8 0.322 0.380 0.331 
2007 87 0.528 0.534 0.186  2007 9 0.646 0.535 0.342 
2008 85 0.514 0.552 0.197   2008 8 0.745 0.603 0.391 
* Some insurers are excluded since they did not report plan types. Such exclusions number 









1.3.2 Literature Review on Risk Management by Capital and Derivative 
Hedging 
 Risk management is becoming an important field of corporate finance research. In 
classic finance theory, risk management is a deadweight loss because a corporation is 
held by diversified shareholders and shareholders can eliminate idiosyncratic risks by 
diversification of their own portfolios under the efficient and complete market. However, 
in the real world, financial markets are not frictionless or complete. Risk management is 
useful to control various frictions and thereby contributes to shareholders’ value. From 
the corporate finance perspective, capital structure theories sit at the heart of modern 
corporate finance research. Capital structure theories under various real world frictions 
provide rationales of corporate risk management. Therefore, we will first overview 
capital structure theories, which actually lay out the foundation for further risk 
management research discussion. Then we will discuss incentives for corporate risk 
management. Later, we will cover empirical risk management research by using capital 
and hedging.   
Capital Structure Theories 
How to finance a firm, debt or equity? This question and related issues have been 
the center of attention in corporate finance research for decades. Miller and Modigliani 
(M&M 1958) first propounded the irrelevance of financing methods to a firm’s total 
market value and cost of capital under perfect capital markets.41 Perfect markets preclude 
                                                          
41 Perfect Capital Market (PCM) refers to: agents are perfectly rational and pursue utility maximization; no 
direct transaction cost, regulation or taxes and all assets are perfectly divisible; perfect competition in 
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the existence of frictions. In reality, the frictionless world doesn’t exist. Taxes, 
transaction or bankruptcy costs, agency costs and information asymmetry introduce 
frictions that affect firms’ debt-equity decisions or capital structures. Therefore tradeoff, 
pecking order, agency theories, market timing, and inertia hypotheses were introduced to 
adapt M&M theory to the real world.42 Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2001) give 
extensive reviews of most of the major capital structure theories. With the assistance of 
comprehensive financial datasets, for instance COMPUSTAT, much empirical research 
has been done to test theories related to capital structure and its determinants.43 Besides 
empirical research, Graham and Harvey (2001) conducted a survey on cost of capital, 
capital budgeting and capital structure decision-making for 392 CFOs and reported 
findings from real practices.    
Empirical research highlights some determinants of capital structure. Harris and 
Raviv’s (1991) summary identified several capital structure determinants in prior 
                                                                                                                                                                             
product and security markets; symmetric information and information is either certain or risky. Fisher, 
Irving (1930), The Theory of Interest, MacMillan, New York. 
42 Tradeoff theory aims at the balance between the tax savings and the cost of financial distress because of 
debt (Miller and Modigliani 1963, 1966). Pecking order theory states that firms prefer financing via 
internal cash flow and debt to equity because of the cost generated by asymmetric information (Ross, 1977 
and Myers and Majluf, 1984). Agency theory is applied to multiple agents’ relationships within a firm, for 
example, manager vs. investors, debt vs. equity holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stulz, 1990). Market 
timing hypothesis says that the choice of debt or equity depends on managers’ exploitation of information 
asymmetries to assess which option better benefits shareholders (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Inertia 
hypothesis argues that leverage fluctuates because managers do not rebalance debt and equity as stock 
prices change (Welch, 2004).    
43 Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) tested the static tradeoff vs. pecking order theory and found more 
explanatory power for the pecking order theory. Fama and French (2002) found support for both tradeoff 
and pecking order theory on firms’ dividend and leverage policies. Frank and Goyal (2003) tested the 
pecking order theory using American firms 1971 – 1998 but failed to find robust support. Harvey, Lins and 
Roper (2004) tested the mitigation effect of debt instrument on agency and information problems. Leary 
and Roberts (2005) explains the slow reversion of capital structure by adjustment cost. Alti (2006) 
examines the market timing implication on capital structure by observing the initial public offerings on the 
hot market and concludes that the market timing persistency vanishes after one year. Lemmon, Roberts and 
Zender (2008) recently found surprisingly stable capital structure throughout years. There is also much 
literature on determinants of capital structure. See Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
and Frank and Goyal (2009).  
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research: earnings volatility, bankruptcy probability, asset tangibility, non-debt tax 
shields, advertising, R&D expenditure, profitability, growth, size, free cash flow and 
uniqueness.44  Rajan and Zingales (1995) used the G-7 countries international data to 
study the capital structure across countries and confirmed previous findings on some of 
the capital structure determinants. Also, they found the explanatory power of market-to-
book ratio. Frank and Goyal (2009) found among various determinants of capital 
structure that median industry leverage, market-to-book asset ratio, tangibility, profits, 
log of assets and expected inflation are the most reliable factors in determining capital 
structure. Parsons and Titman (2008) gives a comprehensive review on empirical 
research on capital structure. They review empirical literature on firms’ characteristics 
associated with the capital structure decision-making and changes in capital structure. 
Besides determinants, they further extend the review to how leverage affects firms’ other 
business decisions such as investment, pricing of products and relationship with suppliers.   
Risk Management Incentives 
 A major motivation to manage risks is to reduce costs caused by various market 
imperfections as we have discussed in the above capital structure section. Specifically, 




                                                          




Cost of financial distress 
 Risk management helps to reduce firms’ cash flow volatility, lower the likelihood 
of financial distress and the cost of financial distress accordingly. Mayers and Smith 
(1982) argue that lower expected transaction cost of bankruptcy is one of the benefits for 
firms purchasing corporate insurance. Smith and Stulz (1985) find that hedging increases 
firms’ expected value by reducing the likelihood of financial distress. Similar argument is 
also found in Stulz (1996) and Tufano (1996), etc. Shapiro and Titman (1986) enrich the 
scope of the cost of financial distress by incorporating buyer and supplier relationships, 
which is known as indirect cost of financial distress. 
 In fact, insurance companies might have greater incentive to lower the cost of 
financial distress because insurers, as financial institutions, are more sensitive to 
insolvency risk.45 Doherty and Tinic (1981) apply M&M theory to the insurance industry. 
They show the relationship between insurers’ ruin probability and premium income so 
that risk management increases insurers’ shareholder value. Sommer (1996) finds a 
negative relationship between insurers’ solvency risk and insurance prices in the property 
and casualty insurance industry. Cummins and Danzon (1997) develop a model of price 
determination in the insurance market, which predicts that the price of insurance is 
inversely related to insurers’ default risk. Phillips, Cummins and Allen (1998) develop a 
model to price insurance by lines for a multiple line insurer subject to default risk. 
Zanjani (2002) argues that insurers’ solvency risk affects their product pricing. For 
                                                          
45 Cummins, Niehaus and Allen (1994) argue that NAIC risk-based capital requirements have the effect of 
creating nonlinear costs of financial distress. Cummins, J.D., Harrington, S. and Niehaus, G., 1994. Risk-
based capital requirements for property-liability insurers: A financial analysis. In: Altman, E. and 
Vanderhoof, I., Editors, 1994. The financial dynamics of the insurance industry, Irwin Professional 
Publishers, Homewood, IL. 
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property and casualty insurers, Epermanis and Harrington (2006) find that premiums 
decline further in lines of business with greater risk sensitivity of demand after a rating 
downgrade. In the life insurance industry, Baranoff and Sager (2008) find that consumers 
react to rating downgrade of life insurers by reducing demand for products of 
downgraded insurers. 
Taxes 
 The convexity of tax schedules for corporate income tax is another factor 
attracting firms to engage in risk management. Smith and Stulz (1985) claims that a 
firm’s expected tax liability falls if hedging reduces pre-tax variability of the firm value. 
MacMinn (1987) shows that hedging helps firms protect income tax credit and tax loss 
carry-forwards. In distinction to previous literature, Graham and Rogers (2002) find no 
evidence that firms hedge in response to tax convexity. And they argue that firms hedge 
to increase debt capacity.   
Underinvestment Problem or Expensive External Financing 
 The underinvestment problem is a typical phenomenon caused by bond and equity 
holders’ conflict, which is also a representation of agency cost (Myers 1977). The idea is 
that equity holders would rather skip projects with positive net present value because debt 
holders have a senior claim to profits. Mayers and Smith (1987) argue that the 
underinvestment problem can be controlled by including a covenant in the bond contract 
requiring insurance coverage. Garven and MacMinn (1993) show that hedging can help 
to alleviate the underinvestment problem. Froot, Sharfstein and Stein (1993) approach the 
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underinvestment problem from the perspective of costly external financing. They claim 
that hedging helps to ensure the corporation has sufficient internal funds to finance 
projects with positive net present value. Gay and Nam (1998) find that derivative use 
may partly be driven by the need to avoid potential underinvestment problems.   
Managerial Risk Aversion 
Managers cannot effectively diversify their human capital and wealth invested in 
companies they work for. Therefore, managers have incentives to engage in risk 
management. Smith and Stulz (1985) develop a model and show that if managers’ 
compensation is a concave function of firm value, they have incentives to reduce firm 
cash flow variability. Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) show that risk-averse managers 
have incentives to reduce risk. The extent to which they choose to hedge the risk depends 
on their compensation package. Rogers (2002) find that CEO risk-taking incentive is 
negatively related to the amount of derivative holdings that are used for hedging purpose. 
Firm or Shareholder Value 
 Recent empirical literature focuses on whether risk management is adding firm or 
shareholder value and in what way. Bartram (2000) reviews theories and empirical 
evidence regarding the contribution of risk management to shareholder value. He finds 
that risk management at the firm level indeed increases firm value.  
In the US airline industry, Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006) show that jet fuel hedging 
is positively related to firm value and they argue that hedging creates firm value through 
reducing the underinvestment cost. However, in the US oil and gas industry, Jin and 
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Jorion (2006) find hedging does not increase firms’ market value. Mackay and Moeller 
(2007) build up a model to estimate value created by corporate risk management. 
Cummins, Dionne, Gagne, and Nouira (2009) study a value creation mechanism of risk 
management in the US property-liability insurance industry and find that risk 
management together with financial intermediation activities create firm value through 
efficiency improvement by cost reduction. Using an insurance dataset from China, Zou 
(2010) finds that risk management helps firms create value by securing valuable new debt 
financing and enhancing investment. 
Risk Management by Capital and Derivative Hedging 
Risk Management by Capital 
 In nonfinancial industries, firms manage their capital structure to balance the 
tradeoff between cost of financial distress and tax benefits generated from debt interest 
payment; to adjust external financing cost; and to control agency cost, etc. We have 
reviewed related theories and literature in the capital structure literature review section. 
In financial industries such as banking and insurance industries, capital plays an even 
more important role because financial institutions have to maintain solvency and meet 
regulatory requirements besides managing all the other similar risks or costs as 
nonfinancial industries. Merton and Perold (1993) identify and define the concept of risk 
capital for financial firms as “the smallest amount that can be invested to insure the value 
of the firms’ net assets against a loss in value relative to the risk-free investment of those 
net assets”. In distinction to risk-based capital and cash capital, risk capital is actually the 
capital designated for the firms’ risk management purpose.    
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 In the banking industry, Berger, Herring and Szego (1995) examine various 
fundamental aspects of capital for financial institutions such as the difference between 
market required capital versus regulatory required capital and how to set up regulatory 
capital standards. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) find that capital is positively related to risk-
taking for banks. Froot and Stein (1998) develop a model to explore capital allocation 
and capital structure decisions for financial institutions. Diamond and Rajan (2000) use 
their model to show that greater capital reduces liquidity at the same time of lowering the 
probability of financial distress. Using Swiss banks data, Rime (2001) finds that 
regulatory pressure induces banks to increase capital while maintaining the risk level. 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) argue that banks may increase their leverage while 
making riskier loans if they engage in other risk management methods. In their research 
on capital and risk controlling for efficiency for European banks, Altunbas et al (2007) 
find that inefficient European banks hold more capital while taking less risk than efficient 
banks. Mehran and Thakor (2010) build up a dynamic model to show that bank value and 
banks’ equity capital are positively correlated.   
 In the insurance industry, Cummins and Lamm-Tennant (1994) provide 
theoretical and empirical evidence on how property-liability insurers’ capital structure 
and lines of business affect the cost of equity capital. Staking and Babbel (1995) have 
several interesting findings for publicly traded property-liability insurers. They find that 
market value of public insurers goes up with interest rate risk when interest rate risk is at 
a high level. Market value goes up with leverage while leverage is at lower level and goes 
down with leverage when leverage is high. They infer that insurers expend scarce 
resources to manage the interest rate risk. Cummins and Sommer (1996) develop a 
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theoretical model to predict the positive relationship between capital and risk. And they 
also prove the prediction empirically using a property-liability insurers’ dataset. Myers 
and Read (2001) use an option pricing model to show how to allocate capital across lines 
of business of insurers. Froot (2007) builds a framework to analyze insurers’ risk 
allocation, capital budgeting and capital structure. He derived the optimal hedging and 
capital structure strategy under imperfect product and financial markets. Shim (2010) 
finds that undercapitalized property-liability insurers increase capital and take more risk 
at the same time.  Also, in the property-liability insurance industry, Harrington and 
Niehaus (2002) compare capital structure decision-making for stock versus mutual 
insurers and find that mutual insurers’ capital ratios are higher on average and more 
sensitive to income than stock insurers because mutual insurers’ financing cost is higher 
than stock insurers. In the life insurance industry, Baranoff and Sager (2002) find a 
positive relationship between life insurers’ capital and asset risk. Baranoff and Sager 
(2003) expand the capital and risk study by incorporating insurers’ organizational form 
and distribution channel. They get consistent findings on the positive relationship 
between capital and asset risk and that stock insurers take greater financial and asset risk. 
Baranoff and Sager (2007) employ an innovative statistical method, the structural 
equation modeling, to analyze life insurers’ risk-taking behavior and find a positive 
relationship between capital and asset risk.  
Risk Management by Derivative Hedging 
 Corporate hedging incentives and decisions have been studied for several decades. 
Early work focuses on theoretical rationales and later research pays more attention to 
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empirical evidence. Stulz (1984) derives optimal hedging policies for both value-
maximizing firms and risk-averse agents in the presence of uncertain future commodities 
prices and hedging position costs. Smith and Stulz (1985) further develop a model 
incorporating hedging as part of a corporate financing policy and address why firms 
hedge. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) argue that financial hedging improves the 
informativeness of corporate earnings. Schrand and Unal (1998) provide an interesting 
perspective on corporate hedging. They argue that hedging is a means of allocating risk 
instead of reducing risk. Firms will choose to reduce risk that provides zero economic 
rent and increase risk that will create positive economic rent. The evidence they provide 
is based on the analysis of the conversion of mutual institutions to stock institutions. 
Stock institutions usually take more risk than mutual institutions. The author finds that 
institutions indeed take more overall risk after converting from mutual to stock 
organizational forms. After conversion, they hedge interest rate risk (reduce risk with 
zero economic rent) while increasing credit risk (increase risk with positive economic 
rent) so that the total risk increases. In empirical work, Mian (1996) examines 771 firms 
reporting hedging activities in 1992 and concludes that the cost of the financial distress 
model is not supported; there is only mixed evidence on the other corporate hedging 
incentives discussed in previous literature; and only the economy of scale is a confirmed 
factor. Gay and Nam (1998) find that firms’ derivative use and growth opportunities are 
positively correlated, which is consistent with the argument that firms hedge to avoid the 
underinvestment problem. Graham and Rogers (2002) find that firms hedge to increase 
debt capacity instead of responding to tax convexity. Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002) 
confirm that as the sensitivity of managers’ stock and stock option portfolio to stock price 
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increases, firms tend to hedge more. Gay, Lin and Smith (2010) analyze a large sample of 
nonfinancial firms and find that firms use derivatives to reduce their financial distress 
risk.    
 Derivative hedging is widely used in the banking industry. Shanker (1996) studies 
US banks from 1986 to1993 and finds that the use of interest rate derivatives helps to 
reduce interest rate risk. Bauer and Ryser (2004) develop a model to derive an optimal 
hedging strategy for banks. Pennings and Garcia (2004) focus on derivative usage of 
small and medium size firms and find heterogeneity regarding risk exposure, risk attitude 
and hedging decisions. Minton and Stulz (2005) inspect banks’ credit derivatives usage 
and find that only a few banks in 2003 used credit derivatives and that those banks are net 
buyers of credit protection. This situation is caused by an illiquid credit derivative market. 
Bartram (2008) studies nonfinancial firms’ foreign exchange rate risk management and 
finds managers to be aggressive in reducing foreign exchange rate risk exposure by using 
derivatives.     
 In the insurance industry, Hoyt (1989) reports survey results on usage of financial 
futures of life insurers and he finds the scale of economy is a major reason for using 
financial futures. Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) identify reasons insurers use derivatives by 
examining 571 life insurers’ annual statements. They find support for hedging incentives 
such as financial distress cost, underinvestment problem, and managerial risk aversion. 
Cummins, Phillips and Smith (2001) conduct a comprehensive study on derivative 
applications of both life and property-liability insurers. They find support for previously 
hypothesized incentives for hedging in these two industries. Moreover, they argue that for 
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insurers participating in derivative activities, the volume of derivative hedging is 
negatively related to insurers’ risk appetite.    
Relationship between Capital and Derivatives Hedging  
 Previous literature confirmed capital and derivative hedging as viable risk 
management tools in different industries. Some recent studies address the relationship 
between the two risk management tools. In fact, findings in Harrington, Mann and 
Niehaus (1995) hint at the substitutability of derivative hedging and capital. They study 
whether insurance derivatives reduce stock insurers’ need for equity capital. For insurers 
engaging in insurance derivatives, they find that insurance futures contracts are effective 
in reducing insurers’ correlated risk that has to be managed by ex post equity capital for 
insurers not employing insurance derivatives. While inspecting the joint determination of 
capital structure and investment risk, Leland (1998) also finds that hedging permits 
greater leverage. Purnanandam (2008) develops a model and shows empirically that 
leverage is positively related to hedging for moderately leveraged firms. Lin, Phillips and 
Smith (2008) also find a positive relationship between leverage and hedging when 
examining firms’ hedging, financing and investment decisions simultaneously for 
nonfinancial industries. On the other hand, Dionne and Triki (2004) show that more 
hedging does not always lead to higher debt capacity and to increase debt capacity is not 





1.3.3 Risk-Taking Behavior Hypotheses 
Finite Risk Hypothesis vs. Excessive Risk Hypothesis 
Two hypotheses have been advanced to explain the capital accumulating and 
investing behavior of insurers. The literature entertains two opposing hypotheses about 
the relationship between capital and risk for insurers.  One set of theories predicts that the 
relationship between capital and asset risk is positive.  If an insurer acts to limit its 
overall risk, then maintaining a low level of capital (high financial risk) would lead it to 
pursue a conservative investment policy (low asset risk). High capital levels should also 
be associated with aggressive investments. In this scenario, we would expect a positive 
correlation between capital and asset risk. Because such theories imply that firms balance 
greater risk in one activity with lower risk in another, we refer to these theories 
collectively as the finite risk hypothesis. They include agency theory (starting with Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), transactions cost economics (Williamson, 1985 and 1988), 
bankruptcy and regulatory cost, and complete markets. For example see Cummins and 
Sommer (1996) for the property casualty industry, Baranoff and Sager (2002 and 2003) 
and Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Berger (1995) for the banking industry.  
On the other hand, if an insurer does not act to limit its overall risk, then there 
may be situations in which the insurer seeks to increase its overall risk. Thus, maintaining 
a low level of capital (high financial risk) might lead an insurer to pursue an aggressive 
investment policy (high asset risk).  In this scenario, we would expect a negative 
correlation between capital and asset risk. In the literature, some theories have predicted 
this outcome. Because they imply that greater risk in one activity may lead to greater risk 
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in another, we refer to these theories collectively as the excessive risk hypothesis. The 
risk subsidy of guaranty funds provides one possible mechanism for the operation of this 
moral hazard. Others include asymmetric information, “go for broke”, signaling and 
adverse selection. See, for example, Cummins (1988), Berger, Herring and Szego (1995) 
and Downs and Sommer (1999).  
Business Strategy Hypothesis 
Using transaction cost economics theory as a basis, Baranoff and Sager (2003) 
advanced the business-strategy hypothesis as an explanation for the essential role of 
product risk in major life insurer decisions.  Under the business-strategy hypothesis, an 
insurer’s choice of a business product is fundamental.  Other financial and organizational 
decisions flow from that basic choice, including the trade-off between capital and asset 
risk that would be deemed appropriate to balance the risks of the chosen business 
products.  The argument is that an insurer logically would make its capital structure 
decision mindful of the risks its products would generate and also mindful of the 
investment risks of its asset portfolio.  Since an insurer – or any firm, in general – would 
not be expected to change its underlying business strategy very often, it is logical that the 
product risk derived from the choice of business would be a pillar undergirding other 








New Product Risk Measures for U.S. Life and Health Insurers 
2.1 New Product Risk Measure for US Life Insurers 
2.1.1 New Product and Related Product Risk  
Worldwide longevity gains add to the pressure on societies to provide for aging 
population. Individuals increasingly fear that their financial resources will not last 
throughout their expected long lives. With their expertise in the risks of longevity, life 
insurers have long marketed private solutions for old age financial security in the form of 
annuities. An annuity is a contract between an individual and an insurance company that 
assures a future flow of income to the individual in return for accumulated premium 
payments. In the last two decades, as apprehension about longevity risk has grown, life 
insurers have innovated rapidly upon the basic design of the annuity to meet different 
customer needs. For example, as traditional pensions vanish, some insurer products can 
emulate disappearing defined benefit plans. In addition, variable annuities permit future 
annuitants’ income flows to rise (or fall) in response to investment performance. Most 
recently, guarantees have been added to variable annuities to reduce their downside risks 
to the annuitants. Insurers limit their own downside risks in these guarantees by highly 
sophisticated dynamic hedging techniques.46, 47    
                                                          
46 See: Prudential White Paper “The Importance of Financial Risk Management in Today’s Variable 
Annuity Market” (2010) at: 




Traditional variable annuities build retirement income for annuitants through 
investments in mutual funds that include equity and fixed income options. These 
annuities are variable because their account value and ultimate annuity, or other cash-out, 
depends upon the market experience of the mutual funds. In a down market, or with poor 
management, the annuitant could be wiped out. Since the insurer does not guarantee 
performance of the mutual funds in a traditional variable annuity and since the 
annuitant’s funds are held in separate accounts and not commingled with the insurer’s 
assets, the risk of poor performance lies solely upon annuitants. The traditional variable 
annuity offers no investment performance risk to the insurer. Nevertheless, the insurer 
earns fees from selling and servicing the products. This arrangement is not necessarily 
advantageous for annuitants: Chen, Yao, and Yu (2007) show that insurer-managed 
mutual funds perform less well than other mutual funds. However, the last ten years have 
seen the dramatic growth of new types of variable annuities that guarantee to protect 
annuitants from market declines in various ways. These guarantees transfer some of the 
investment risk from annuitants to the life insurers.  
In the last ten years, insurers have begun to offer variable annuities with 
guaranteed living benefits, after the initial introduction of such products proved highly 
popular. Living guarantees protect annuitants in various ways during their lifetimes 
against equity and bond market declines. Guaranteed death benefits are another type of 
popular guarantee that may be attached to traditional variable annuities.  Death benefit 
guarantees typically assure return of the initial investment upon death of the annuitant. 
                                                                                                                                                                             





Life insurers manage well the risks of death benefit guarantees through their long 
experience with mortality tables. Guaranteed living benefits are newer. This dissertation 
focuses on those variable annuities that offer guaranteed living benefits (VAGLB).48 
Generally, these guarantees are extra-cost add-on features to a basic variable annuity. 
Insurers must reserve against the risks of these guarantees with their own funds on their 
own books.   
The class of living benefit guarantees includes three major sub-classes: (1) 
Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefits (GMIB), (2) Guaranteed Minimum Accumulation 
Benefits (GMAB), and (3) Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefits (GMWB). Some 
policies offer more than one of the three types. 
1. Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefits protect the annuitization income of the 
portfolio by guaranteeing a formulaically computed minimum periodic 
income upon annuitization.  
 
2. Guaranteed Minimum Accumulation Benefits protect the accumulated value of 
the annuity from market fluctuations by guaranteeing the greater of actual 
account value or a formulaically computed minimum.  
 
3. Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefits protect against illiquidity during 
the deferment (accumulation) period by guaranteeing the annuitant the right to 
withdraw a contractual percentage of his account value, without further fee, 
                                                          
48 The presentation in the 2011 Geneva Association Amsterdam Circle of Chief Economists explained the 
product in simple terms. Jacob Herschler (February 18, 2011) “Next Generation Lifetime Income 




during and perhaps after the deferment period. GMWB is often combined with 
features of GMAB and GMIB to provide a product of appealing flexibility. 
Since its introduction in 2002, GMWB has been the most popular type of 
variable annuity with guarantees. 
Each VAGLB contract has a portfolio account. This account belongs to the 
annuitant and is required to be separate from, and not commingled with, the life insurer’s 
own accounts. Each life insurer reports the combined value of its VAGLB annuitants’ 
portfolio accounts in its annual statement filed with the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC). This total is called the total related account value for the insurer. 
It represents the current actual market value for the portfolios of all of the insurer’s 
VAGLB annuitants combined. The annual statement also breaks down the insurer’s total 
related account value by the type of guaranteed benefit. The breakdown includes not just 
categories for the three major individual sub-classes of guaranteed living benefits, but 
also categories for combinations of these sub-classes. To simplify our analysis, we assign 
each VAGLB contract uniquely to one of the three major sub-classes. Contracts that have 
multiple benefit guarantees are assigned to the withdrawal type, which has the most 
severe risk consequences for the insurer among the three single-benefit types.49 Clearly, a 
multiple-benefit contract presents more guarantee risk to an insurer than the same 
contract with all but one of the guarantees stripped away. However, by essentially 
                                                          
49 There are 6 companies in 2006 and 7 companies in 2007 that sell some contracts with multiple 
guaranteed benefits. Almost all multiple guarantee contracts that we found had a withdrawal guarantee. The 
most common combination of guarantees is GMWB packaged with GMIB. GMAB is rarely combined with 
the other living benefits. In the NAIC database, we find only one insurer selling multiple guarantee 
contracts with GMAB and GMIB in 2007.  We classify it as GMAB type because GMAB exposes insurers 
to more liquidity risk.  
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dropping all but one guarantee from multiple-benefit contracts, our assignment rule is 
therefore conservative in the computation of guarantee risk.  
After application of our assignment rule, the total related account value for GMIB 
(income) products was about $220 billion at the end of 2007. GMAB (accumulation) 
products totaled about $60 billion; and GMWB (withdrawal) products totaled about $229 
billion.  
The market for variable annuities has boomed since the market recovery that 
began in 2002. Most of the growth has occurred in variable annuity products that offer 
guarantees, and especially in those that offer living benefit guarantees. There has been a 
surge in the total related account value. From the end of 2006 to the end of 2007, the total 
related account value of VAGLB annuitants grew from $383 billion to $508 billion, and 
the number of insurers offering VAGLB increased from 79 to 85. Around 150 life 
insurers offer variable annuities with some kind of guarantee. In 2008, following closely 
on the heels of the systemic collapse of mortgage-backed securities, came the crisis in 
equity and bond markets. Equity indices declined substantially. Underwriters of VAGLB 
confronted the need to increase reserves for contractually guaranteed returns to annuitants 
in the presence of negative portfolio returns. So severe was the market contraction (most 
equity indices had lost about 40% of their peak value by the end of 2008) that concern 
was raised as to the long term viability of VAGLB.  
VAGLB exposes life insurers to new product risk. A typical VAGLB consists of a 
regular variable annuity bundled with an additional contractual guarantee of investment 
performance should the variable component underperform. For example, the guarantee 
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may bind the insurer to credit the annuitant with a minimum annual return on his 
portfolio accumulation, even if the market value of the portfolio declines, as most 
equities and bonds did in 2008 and 2009.50 Other types of living guarantees may protect 
the annuitization income or withdrawal benefits of the annuitant. In each case, the 
guarantee transfers some of the investment risk of a variable annuity from the annuitant 
to the insurer. The innovation of variable annuity guarantees introduces a new dimension 
of product risk for U.S. life insurers, which may have a negative impact on their capital 
structure during market downturns. In fact, the collapse in equity markets of 2008-2009 
did expose the risks that insurers face in these new products. Since these products 
continue to grow in popularity, even after the equity crisis, concerns have been raised 
about the risk of insurer default on their guarantees in a future crisis and the threat that 
may pose to the well-being of society’s retirees. Therefore, it is imperative to develop a 
measure that can capture and gauge the new product risk caused by VAGLB. To this end, 
we propose the guarantee risk, which will be explained next.    
2.1.2 New Product Risk Measure – Guarantee Risk  
Guarantee Risk Calculation 
Our guarantee risk proxy encompasses a value-at-risk measure. Via simulation, 
we estimate the potential deficiency in the reserves that are necessary to protect against a 
tail event of a given probability originating from the insurer’s exposure to the guarantees 
                                                          
50 The popular media have covered these products. See for example the Wall Street Journal article from 
7/24/2009 “Long Derided, This Investment Now Looks Wise Thanks to Guarantees, Variable Annuities 
Paid Even When Stocks Didn’t” by Leslie Scism. 
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of VAGLB.51 To simplify the welter of contractual terms for VAGLB, we propose an 
archetype contract for each of the three sub-classes of guaranteed living benefits. Each 
VAGLB archetype has standard contractual terms. As a first-order approximation, we 
suppose that each VAGLB contract follows the terms of precisely one of the three 
archetypes. VAGLB contracts with multiple guarantees are assigned to the withdrawal 
type, as previously discussed. In reality, of course, actual contracts vary within guarantee 
categories. But we are not privy to the assortment of actual contracts, and if we were, it 
would be a daunting task to model each. The archetypes seem reasonably representative 
of their corresponding guarantee types, based upon our review of some available VAGLB 
prospectuses.  
GMIB archetype contract. There is a single initial investment. The deferment 
period is ten years. At the end of the deferment period, the annuitant receives a 
lifetime annual income equal to 5% of the greater of the actual account value or 
the single initial investment compounded at 5% per annum throughout the 
deferment period.  
GMAB archetype contract. There is a single initial investment. The deferment 
period is ten years. At the end of the deferment period, the annuitant has a choice: 
receive as a lump-sum the greater of actual account value or 1.2 times the single 
                                                          
51 The VAGLB reserve proxy calculation (guarantee risk) is based on work of the VARWG the variable 
annuity reserve valuation method proposed by Life and Health Actuarial Task Force, and passed in 
September, 2008 by the NAIC. The variable annuity reserve valuation method is also called the Actuarial 
Guideline XXXXIII (AG 43), corresponding to the previous AG 34 for products with guaranteed death 
benefits (GMDB) and AG 39 for products with guaranteed living benefits (GMLB). AG 43 has been in 
effect since December 31, 2009. The scope covers all variable annuity products sold after 1981. The new 
reserve valuation method is highly consistent with the calculation of risk based capital C3 Phase II, 
effective in December 2006. In fact, both the reserve valuation calculation and the C3 calculation use the 
same simulation methodology. 
81 
 
initial investment, or annuitize and receive a lifetime annual income of 5% of the 
greater of the actual account value or 1.2 times the single initial investment. We 
suppose that 50 percent of the annuitants choose the lump-sum cash-out, and 50 
percent choose to annuitize. 
GMWB archetype contract. There is a single initial investment. The annuitant 
may withdraw 7% of the single initial investment annually, without penalty fee, 
for 14.2 years. However, each such withdrawal reduces the actual account value. 
If the actual account value reaches zero before the single initial investment has 
been recovered, withdrawals may nonetheless continue. After 14.2 years, all of 
the single initial investment will have been recovered. At that time, if the actual 
account value is positive, the annuitant receives the residual account balance as a 
lump sum payment.  
For each archetype contract, we assume that all annuitants are alive at least until 
the end of the deferment period, that they do not surrender their policies during deferment, 
nor do they withdraw funds in excess of the amount contractually permitted without 
penalty. Usually, guaranteed living benefits expire at the end of the deferment period. 
Insurers’ annuity risks do not expire, but their guarantee risks do. Since our focus is on 
the risk caused by guaranteed benefits, we terminate the calculation of our guarantee risk 
proxy at the end of the deferment period.  
In addition to breaking down each insurer’s VAGLB account values by type of 
guarantee, the NAIC data further break down the account values by number of years 
remaining in the deferment periods for contracts written prior to the year of reporting. 
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Our calculations take into account the number of years remaining in the deferment period. 
However, the remaining deferment period is not reported for GMWB (withdrawal) type 
products.52 We treat GMWB products as though the year of reporting is the initial year of 
the contract. 
In the calculation of our guarantee risk proxy, we adopt the guarantee reserves 
calculation method developed by the Variable Annuity Reserve Working Group 
(VARWG). This method is approved by NAIC and has been in effect since December 
2009.53  We construct our guarantee risk proxy by applying the VARWG method to the 
three archetype contracts describe above. As we noted above, this method, at its core, is 
similar to value-at-risk. It is based on simulation and Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE). 
There are two major steps in the calculation: 
Step 1 (Simulation): 10,000 portfolio return series are simulated according to 
historical data on major market indexes. Each of the 10,000 iterations provides 
hypothetical, but realistic, monthly stock and bond returns for the next 30 years.54 
For each simulated return series, we project the monthly variable annuity account 
values until the end of the deferment period.55 At the same time, we calculate the 
                                                          
52 By definition, withdrawals are supposed to be deferred during the deferment period. Since GMWB 
annuities explicitly permit withdrawals, they lack deferral. 
53 Comment on the Exposed AG VACARVM from the American Academy of Actuaries’ Variable Annuity 
Reserve Work Group, presented to the NAIC Life and Health Task Force. The variable annuities reserves 
calculation method was passed by NAIC in September 2008 and was in effect after December 2009. It 
applies to all variable annuities sold after 1981.  
54 Equity returns and bond returns series are simulated separately. The original VARWG simulated return 
series are posted on the website of the American Academy of Actuaries. The historical data used for 
simulating the return series on the AAA website extend from 1955 to 2003. 
55 The reserve calculation method proposed by VARWG aims at the entire duration of annuity products, 
including the payout period. However, our focus is on the risk of guaranteed benefits during the deferment 
period, not on the risk caused by mortality, expenses, interest rates or other sources of annuity risk. 
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guaranteed contract values through the end of the deferment period according to 
the terms of each archetype contract. At each year end during the deferment 
period, the difference between the guaranteed or promised obligation in the 
contract and the projected annuity account value is the annual deficiency. A 
positive deficiency means a potential liability for the life insurer. Each iteration of 
the simulation thus yields a set of annual deficiencies until the end of the 
deferment period – one deficiency for each year of the deferment period. For each 
iteration, the worst of its annual deficiencies is noted. By this means, we obtain a 
simulated distribution of 10,000 worst-in-deferment-period deficiencies.   
Step 2 (Conditional Tail Expectation): Our guarantee risk proxy, GuarRisk, is the 
mean of the 3,000 largest of the 10,000 worst deficiencies in the simulation.56   
Clearly, the adequacy of our guarantee risk proxy depends critically upon having 
a reasonable model of future market returns for the asset classes for which the guarantees 
are made. Following is a brief explanation of how the market return series are 
generated.57 The Life Capital Adequacy Subcommittee (LCAS) has identified 19 asset 
classes commonly held in variable annuities accounts. These asset classes include money 
market funds, U.S. intermediate term government bonds, diversified large capital U.S. 
equity, etc. LCAS collects historical monthly return data for the 19 asset classes, which 
start as early as December 1955 and end in December 2003. The 19 asset classes are 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Therefore, we terminate the projections at the end of deferment period, which is ten years for our GMIB 
and GMAB archetype contracts. 
56 Thus the guarantee risk is the 30 percent Conditional Tail Expectation (30 CTE). 
57 Comment on the Exposed AG VACARVM from the American Academy of Actuaries’ Variable Annuity 
Reserve Work Group, presented to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ Life and Health 
Actuarial Task Force, September 2007. 
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divided into bond-type assets and equity-type assets. LCAS runs simulation models for 
each type, incorporating intercorrelations among the 19 asset classes.58 After estimating 
parameters using historical data, the models mix in normally distributed random 
perturbations to simulate 360 months of future returns for each asset class. The American 
Academy of Actuaries website provides 10,000 downloadable iterations of the simulation, 
where each iteration consists of the 19 simulated series for each of the next 360 months – 
called “Pre-Packaged Scenarios”. In January 2006, LCAS released “interest rate 
generator” - a set of Microsoft Excel® macros to help actuaries update the simulation for 
bond-type assets by incorporating historical data that post-date 2003. We have utilized 
these macros for this paper. We also note that as of the time of this writing, the online 
equity simulations have not been updated to incorporate historical equity returns that 
post-date 2003; nor have any macros been posted for this purpose. In order to include the 
most recent equity returns in calculations of our guarantee risk proxy, we therefore 
replicated the LCAS methodology using the stochastic analysis model for equities 
recommended by LCAS and historical data on equity returns through the year of 
calculation of GuarRisk (2006 or 2007).  Thus, our 30-year simulated series for both 
bonds and equities are based on historical data through 2006 for GuarRisk2006 and 
through 2007 for GuarRisk2007.  
 
 
                                                          
58 Stochastic models for bonds and equities, and parameter descriptions can be found in “Recommended 
Approach for Setting Regulatory Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Variable Annuities and Similar 
Products” by Life Capital Adequacy Subcommittee (LCAS). American Academy of Actuaries, June 2005.   
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Archetype Examples for Guarantee Risk Calculation 
Income Guarantees 
Let us suppose that Acme Life, a hypothetical insurer, has just received $100,000 
in investments for variable annuity contracts with income guarantees. We suppose that all 
of these contracts follow the terms of the GMIB (income guarantee) archetype contract. 
In addition, for this illustration, we suppose that the contract funds are invested 60% in 
equities and 40% in bonds. In its separate accounts, Acme records a total related account 
value of $100,000. This is the actual account value for the annuitants. Acme sets up a 
corresponding shadow account, “Guaranteed Contract Value”, to keep track of the 
guaranteed amount on which it may become obligated to pay its income guarantee. 
Initially, this amount is also $100,000, but will increase by 5% per year according to the 
terms of the GMIB archetype contract. To calculate guarantee risk for this example, the 
year-to-year change in actual account value is determined by simulation of market returns. 
10,000 iterations are run. For each iteration, the year-to-year difference between actual 
annuitant account value and guaranteed amount is calculated, and the greatest annual 
deficiency (guaranteed amount – account value) for the (at most) 30-year duration of the 
iteration is recorded. To illustrate the calculations, we randomly select one simulated 
return series out of the 10,000.59 At the end of the first year, the actual account value 
(total related account value) has increased to $108,917 because of favorable market 
returns (see Table 2.1, I). The Guaranteed Contract Value has grown to $105,000, per the 
                                                          
59 Actually, two simulations – one for equities and one for bonds (they are correlated), since the example 
hypothesizes 60% investment in equities and 40% in bonds. By bad luck, we got an iteration with 
particularly poor returns during the deferment period, so there are many deficiencies. 
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contract. There have been no payouts. The GMIB archetype contract provides that the 
beneficiary can ultimately draw an annual income equal to 5% of the greater of the actual 
account value or the Guaranteed Contract Value. The actual account value is more than 
sufficient to cover the income guarantee in year one. There is no deficiency. In fact, there 
is a “sufficiency” of $3,917. These figures are shown in Table 2.1, I for year one. For 
year two, there is also a sufficiency. But in year three, there is a market decline and the 
actual account value declines to $97,687, whereas the steady growth of the income 
guarantee makes the Guaranteed Contract Value – the amount on which Acme may 
become obligated to pay income – equal to $115,763 (see Table 2.1, I). There is a 
deficiency of $18,076. If the income guarantee were to be triggered now, Acme is 
obligated to an annual payout of 5% on $18,076 more than is in the annuitants’ actual 
accounts. There are also deficiencies in each of the remaining years 4-10. At the end of 
year 10, the annuitant annuitizes the larger of the actual account value ($110,896) or the 
Guaranteed Contract Value ($162,889).  
For the selected iteration, the worst deficiency is $53,560 and occurs in year nine. 
The GMIB reserve proxy calculation records the worst deficiency figure of $53,560 for 
this iteration. For each of the remaining 9,999 iterations, the value of the deficiency for 
the worst year is recorded. After 10,000 iterations of the simulation, there are 10,000 
worst deficiencies, of which our illustrative $53,560 is one. Figure 2.1 displays their 
histogram. As the histogram shows, very few of the iterations result in sufficiency (to the 
left of zero); almost all result in deficiencies (to the right of zero). Moreover, the shaded 
region in the figure shows the worst 30% of the 10,000 iterations. The GMIB guarantee 







Accumulation and Withdrawal Guarantees 
Table 2.1 cases II and III show two corresponding examples of the calculation of 
the guarantee risk for each of the other two categories of guaranteed living benefits. The 
set-up for each of these three examples is similar to the GMIB example: We again 
hypothesize that Acme Life receives $100,000 of funds for contracts with accumulation 
and withdrawal benefit guarantees, respectively. We suppose that all of these policies 
follow the terms of the corresponding accumulation and withdrawal benefit guarantee 
archetype contract. In addition, we again suppose that the funds are invested 60% in 
equities and 40% in bonds. In its separate accounts, Acme begins each example with a 
total related account value of $100,000 and a corresponding shadow “Guaranteed 
Contract Value”. The three examples use the same market simulation as the GMIB 
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example, but the year-to-year progression of the examples differs due to the different 
terms of the governing archetype contracts.  
For example, in the GMAB example (Table 2.1, II), the Guaranteed Contract 
Value rises at a compounded rate from the initial $100,000 to the guaranteed $120,000 
amount in year 10, when half the insureds take a lump-sum payout and half annuitize. 
The largest deficiency is $31,272, which occurs in year five.  
In the withdrawal benefit example (Table 2.1, III), the beneficiary withdraws the 
permitted 7% x $100,000 = $7,000 annually. The withdrawal is real money, so reduces 
any market gain or the principal in the actual account. Moreover, the insurer no longer 
need guarantee the payment of the withdrawal, once paid. Thus, withdrawals reduce both 
the actual account value and the Guaranteed Contract Value until the initial $100,000 
investment has been recovered. At that point, in year 15, there is a remainder of $7,027 in 
the insured’s account. Per the GMWB archetype contract, the insured then receives the 
remainder as a lump-sum payout. 
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Table 2.1 Illustration of VAGLB Reserves Calculation *** 
* This portfolio return series is randomly selected from 10,000 simulated return series as of year 2006. Equity returns and bond returns are simulated separately, although with 
correlation. The method can be found on the American Academy of Actuaries website. For this example, we assume 60% of assets allocated to equity and 40% to bond. 
 ** Terms of various guaranteed benefit contracts (GMIB, GMAB and GMWB) can be found at the beginning of Section 2.1.2 Guarantee Risk in the article. 
*** The calculation in this table reflects only Step 1 of the guarantee risk calculation described at the beginning of Section 2.1.2 Guarantee Risk. To get the final guarantee 
Risk, similar calculation for each type of contract will be repeated 10,000 times using 10,000 different simulated portfolio return series. See step 2 or the appendix section for 
details.
Year End 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                  
60% Equity 40% Bond Simulated Return Series as of 2006*              
  1.09 1.14 0.98 0.96 0.78 0.84 0.96 1.02 1.02 1.11 1.11 1.17 1.27 1.44 1.58 
                  
I. With GMIB 5% rollup, 10 years waiting period**              
Actual Account Value $108,917  $113,630  $97,687  $96,263  $78,272  $83,784  $95,781  $102,414  $101,573  $110,896            
Guaranteed Contract Value $105,000  $110,250  $115,763  $121,551  $127,628  $134,010  $140,710  $147,746  $155,133  $162,889            
Payout $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0            
Deficiency ($3,917) ($3,380) $18,076  $25,287  $49,356  $50,225  $44,929  $45,332  $53,560  $51,993       
                  
II. With GMAB 1.2 times initial premium return, 10 years of waiting period**            
Actual Account Value $108,917  $113,630  $97,687  $96,263  $78,272  $83,784  $95,781  $102,414  $101,573  $110,896           
Guaranteed Contract Value  $101,840  $103,714  $105,622  $107,565  $109,545  $111,560  $113,613  $115,703  $117,832  $120,000            
Payout $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0            
Deficiency ($7,077) ($9,916) $7,935  $11,302  $31,272  $27,776  $17,832  $13,289  $16,259  $9,104       
                  
III. With GMWB 7% withdrawal each year**               
Actual Account value $101,917  $99,327  $78,391  $70,248  $50,120  $46,649  $46,328  $42,536  $35,187  $31,417  $24,382  $18,831  $13,412  $8,228  $7,027  
Guaranteed Contract Value $93,000  $86,000  $79,000  $72,000  $65,000  $58,000  $51,000  $44,000  $37,000  $30,000  $23,000  $16,000  $9,000  $2,000  $0  
Payout $7,000  $7,000  $7,000  $7,000  $7,000  $7,000  $7,000  $7,000  $7,000  $7,000  $7,000  $7,000  $7,000  $7,000  $2,000  
Deficiency ($8,917) ($13,327) $609  $1,752  $14,880  $11,351  $4,672  $1,464  $1,813  ($1,417) ($1,382) ($2,831) ($4,412) ($6,228) ($7,027) 
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Guarantee Risk Proxy 
 To apply the guarantee risk proxy to NAIC life insurers’ VAGLB data, we 
employ three model portfolios for the VAGLB accounts that annuitants hold with life 
insurers: 50% equity and 50% bond, 60% equity and 40% bond, and 80% equity and 20% 
bond. To be sure, actual VAGLB portfolios display a wide range of investment options. 
But the three model portfolios represent commonly occurring asset allocations in 
VAGLB accounts. For each model portfolio, we calculate the guarantee risk as of the end 
of 2006 and 2007 following the methodology presented above. Table 2.2 shows the 
guarantee risk in two years, both in absolute terms and as percentage of total related 
account value. 
Table 2.2. Guarantee Risk of VAGLB products in 2006 and 2007, for firms with VAGLB exposure 






Mean 50th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev 
2006 Stocks 50%, Bonds 50% 41,594,479,619 585,837,741 86,767,230 703,196,228 991,574,665 
  Stocks 60%, Bonds 40% 47,986,981,025 675,872,972 96,724,695 813,806,286 1,133,606,104 
  Stocks 80%, Bonds 20% 62,614,232,852 881,890,604 131,910,585 1,068,795,883 1,463,628,689 
2007 Stocks 50%, Bonds 50% 62,787,152,580 784,839,407 112,269,569 795,781,957 1,628,882,519 
  Stocks 60%, Bonds 40% 71,438,073,018 881,951,519 129,452,027 960,048,621 1,801,344,632 







As Percentage of Total Related Account Value 
Mean 50th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev 
2006 Stocks 50%, Bonds 50% 3.78% 2.60% 6.08% 3.71% 
  Stocks 60%, Bonds 40% 4.32% 2.90% 7.12% 4.16% 
  Stocks 80%, Bonds 20% 5.58% 3.81% 8.83% 5.20% 
2007 Stocks 50%, Bonds 50% 4.38% 2.61% 6.26% 4.64% 
  Stocks 60%, Bonds 40% 4.93% 3.09% 7.27% 5.12% 















2.2 Product Risk Measure for US Health Insurers 
2.2.1 Health Insurers’ Product Risk  
 Health insurers underwrite various health insurance policies. Their lines of 
business include Comprehensive, Federal Employee Health Benefits Plans (FEHPs), 
Medicare, Medicare Supplement or MediGap, Medicaid, Dental, Vision, other health 
related products (including disability, prescription drug and long term care). We 
described health insurers’ major lines of business in chapter 1 section 1.1.3. We also 
discussed factors contributing to high product risk of health insurance in general. In this 
section, we will further analyze the factors that differentiate product risk carried by each 
line of business and classify major products with similar risk levels into groups.  
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) serves as the major theoretical foundation to 
differentiate health insurance products’ risk levels. In general, the broader the coverage 
and the less complete the specification of coverage, the higher the product risk. The lines 
of business provide coverage for different types of health perils. For instance, 
comprehensive health insurance provides broad coverage for most types of healthcare 
expenses, from doctor visits and preventative services to hospital stays and surgeries. 
Typically, covered individuals are under 65 years old and obtain insurance through their 
employers. On the other hand, dental and vision insurance are limited in scope, and 
policies may be subject to a relatively low cap of perhaps $2,000. Health insurance 
policies with broader coverage and implicit definitions of medical services may expose 
health insurers to more uncertainties on claims and expenses and consequently embody 
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more product risk. In the language of transaction cost economics, a health insurance 
contract with broad coverage is more incomplete and relational (see Williamson, 1985) 
than a contract of limited scope. The contracts are implicit and open to interpretation.60 
Therefore, coverage is a key factor to differentiate product risk level for health insurers’ 
various lines of business. We classify seven major lines of business into four groups: 
working population group, limited coverage group, Medicare group, and welfare group.        
The working population group includes comprehensive insurance and federal 
employee health benefit plans (FEHPs). Similar to comprehensive health insurance, 
FEHPs also provide comprehensive coverage, but to federal employees. Since both 
comprehensive health insurance and FEHPs cover people still in work force, we name 
this group the working population group. The comprehensive coverage of both types of 
health insurance contracts embodies the highest product risk. It promises coverage for a 
multitude of illnesses and conditions up to very large limits (and no limits per PPACA). 
Moreover, medical innovation introduces new treatments and procedures not anticipated 
by the parties to the contracts. Legislation and court rulings may expand the contract 
coverage. Under PPACA, there can be no limit on lifetime benefit amounts.  
The limited coverage group includes dental and vision insurance. An insurer that 
sells primarily one type of limited benefit coverage, such as dental care or vision care, 
should have limited product risk. The dental and vision insurance coverage contract is 
usually explicit with major limits on procedures and maximum benefit amounts. For 
                                                          
60 The media often report on consumers’ disputes with health insurers over coverage.  A much broader 




example, coverage for dental insurance might be limited to no more than $2,000 per year 
regardless of the number of procedures. Therefore, we expect that substantial exposure to 
dental or vision coverage should confer less product risk than substantial exposure to 
comprehensive health coverage of the working population group. 
Unlike the other lines of business, Medicare and Medicaid are public insurance 
administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Insurers are 
usually contractors of CMS. Therefore, comprehensive coverage for Medicare and 
Medicaid are determined and monitored closely by the government. And the government 
also pays for much of Medicare and Medicaid costs.  
The Medicare group includes Medicare and Medicare supplemental insurance. 
Medicare, established by the federal government in 1966, is funded by the Federal 
government by a mandatory tax on worker salaries. Payment of the tax during working 
years qualifies workers for comprehensive Medicare coverage when they reach 65 years 
of age.61 Part A of Medicare covers hospitalization; Part B covers doctor visits. The 
Balance Budget Act of 1997 established a new part for the Medicare program – Medicare 
Advantage (MA) or Medicare Part C, which allows private health insurers to participate 
in Medicare by offering coverage that wraps Parts A and B with additional coverage like 
prescription drugs. The primary intent of the MA program is to reduce Medicare costs by 
funneling Medicare beneficiaries into managed care programs in which private health 
insurers have considerable experience and expertise. The incentive for Medicare 
beneficiaries is the availability of additional coverage at little extra cost. A disincentive is 
                                                          
61 Medicare also provides coverage for people under 65 with certain disabilities and people of all ages with 
end-stage renal disease (permanent kidney failure requiring dialysis or a kidney transplant), www.cms.gov. 
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the number of restrictions in managed care, such as choice of physician. Medicare Part C 
or MA bundles Medicare Part A, Part B and additional coverage. Medicare Part A and 
Part B coverage is monitored and sponsored by the federal government (not-at-risk 
portion). And the additional coverage exposes health insurers to financial risk (at-risk 
portion). However, when reporting to NAIC, health insurers do not unbundle their data so 
that the at-risk portion of Part C is separated from the not-at-risk portion.   
Underwriting MA exposes health insurers to comprehensive product risk. 
However, in practice, the amount of MA risk may be limited for various reasons. First, 
MA coverage is defined and administered by CMS, which processes the most 
comprehensive medical services data and research on the national level. CMS uses an 
extensive coding system to monitor all medical services provided to beneficiaries. The 
Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code was adopted by the CMS Healthcare 
Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) in 1983 and is maintained by the American 
Medical Association (AMA), which explicitly defines each medical service provided.62 
Comprehensive historical data and research help to improve actuarial results and reduces 
MA product risk. Second, contracting with CMS effectively reduces health insurers’ risk 
exposure. Health insurers follow actuarial instructions to submit bids for MA business 
every year.63 CMS has a benchmark for each geographic area to determine the payment 
for medical services. If an insurer’s bid is below the benchmark, CMS will pay the bid 
amount adjusted for individual risk factors plus a rebate with the amount determined by 
                                                          
62 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), http://www.cms.gov/MedHCPCSGenInfo/ 
CPT Process – How a Code Becomes a Code, www.ama-assn.org   
63 http://www.cms.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/09_Bid_Forms_and_Instructions.asp#TopOfPage is 
the bid pricing tools and instruction on CMS website that is updated annually. 
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law. If the bid is equal to or above the benchmark, CMS will pay insurers the amount of 
the benchmark adjusted for individual risk factors plus a subsidy.64  Under the current 
payment scheme, CMS will cover both efficient and less efficient health insurers’ cost. 
Therefore, the product risk carried by MA is reduced to the minimal level for health 
insurers.   
Medicare supplement insurance is another type of insurance related to Medicare, 
but distinct from Parts A, B and C. Medicare supplement is secondary insurance; 
Medicare is primary. Medicare beneficiaries may purchase Medicare supplement from 
private health insurers to cover certain out-of-pocket expenses that exceed Medicare 
payments, such as copayments and deductibles.  Medicare supplemental insurance is 
contingent upon basic Medicare coverage. The market size of Medicare supplemental 
insurance is limited as well (see Table 1.3 and 1.4). Therefore, we combine Medicare and 
Medicare supplemental insurance and call it the Medicare group.     
The welfare group refers to Medicaid. Medicaid is jointly funded by the states and 
the Federal government. Beneficiaries are usually low-income mothers and children, 
elderly and disabled individuals. Even though a government funded program, Medicaid 
exposes health insurers to product risk. The contributing factors are: variation of 
coverage contingent upon the financial situation of each state and beneficiaries’ health 
status. Unlike Medicare, Medicaid is administered at the state level. The scope of its 
                                                          





comprehensive coverage varies from state to state. 65  State-administered Medicaid 
programs have been putting effort into controlling and cutting cost by managed care. In 
recent years, Medicare managed care enrollment went from 55.76% in 2000 to 71.73% in 
2009.66 On the other hand, PPACA requires state Medicaid programs to incorporate 
National Correct Coding Initiative (NCCI) in their claim processing system by October 
1st, 2010.67 These factors may help to unify state-administered Medicaid programs in the 
future. However, health insurers underwriting Medicaid during the period of our dataset 
were still exposed to more uncertainties. In addition, the Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation report shows that Medicaid enrollees are poorer and sicker than the low-
income privately insured population.68 Poorer health status brings more uncertainties to 
the coverage resulting in higher product risk level. 
As a brief summary of the above discussion, applying transaction cost economics 
(TCE), we classify health insurers’ major lines of business into four groups based on 
product risk level: working population group (comprehensive and FEHPs insurance), 
limited coverage group (dental and vision insurance), Medicare group (Medicare and 
Medicare Supplement insurance), and Welfare group (Medicaid).  
 
 
                                                          
65 ‘Understanding Healthcare Financial Management’, Louis Gapenski, Health Administration Press, 
Chicago Louis Gapenski, Page 68 
66 ‘National Summary of Medicaid Managed Care Programs and Enrollment As of June 30, 2009’, Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
67 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidNCCICoding/ 
68 Who Needs Medicaid?, The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and Uninsured, April 2006 
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2.2.2 Product Risk Measures for U.S. Health Insurers 
To assess health insurers’ product risk, we develop exposure-based measures for 
the working population group, limited coverage group, Medicare group, and welfare 
group. Specifically, we use the premium income of an insurer from each of the four types, 
divided by total assets of the insurer.  We propose the ratio as health insurers’ product 
risk proxy. Therefore, we have four corresponding product risk proxies for each group: 
working population product risk, limited coverage product risk, Medicare product risk, 
and welfare product risk. For insurers who do not underwrite a specific line of business, 
the NAIC dataset records zero premium income. Accordingly, the product risk of a 
specific group will be zero if an insurer does not underwrite any lines of business in that 
group. Table 2.3 summarizes the four product risk proxies. Table 2.4 shows summary 
statistics for the product risk proxies of U.S. health insurers for 2002, 2004, 2006, and 
2008. 
Table 2.3 Health Insurers' Product Risk Proxies 
Variables Description 
Working Population Product 
Risk (Comprehensive Premium Income + FEHPs Premium Income) / Total Assets 
Limited Coverage Product Risk (Dental Premium Income + Vision Premium Income) / Total Assets 
Medicare Product Risk (Medicare Premium Income + Medicare Supplement Premium Income) / Total Assets 





Table 2.4. Summary Statistics for NAIC Health Insurers 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 
  2002  2004 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median  N Mean 
Std 
Dev Median 
Working population product risk* 458 2.312 1.655 2.178  447 2.183 1.636 2.031 
Limited coverage product risk* 250 2.212 4.022 1.294  246 1.907 2.374 1.17 
Medicare product risk* 216 0.885 1.238 0.414  223 0.993 1.589 0.364 
Welfare product risk* 177 2.226 3.459 1.265  168 2.096 2.352 1.401 
           
  2006  2008 
  N Mean Std Dev Median  N Mean 
Std 
Dev Median 
Working population product risk* 451 2.076 1.508 1.867  452 1.909 1.357 1.719 
Limited coverage product risk* 268 1.808 2.357 0.99  269 1.75 2.356 0.974 
Medicare product risk* 304 1.093 1.486 0.543  380 1.299 1.705 0.637 
Welfare product risk* 178 2.052 2.023 1.682   183 1.983 1.766 1.588 
* Product risk is as defined in Table 2. Summary statistics for product risk in this table are in raw form (not 
logarithms) and include only health insurers with positive premium income in a specific group.  Product risk may 
exceed 1 because the total premium income in each group (the numerator) may exceed total assets (the 













Product Risk Management in the Context of Other Enterprise Risks 
3.1 Risk Management by Capital under New VAGLB Product Risk in U.S. Life 
Insurance Industry 
3.1.1 Hypothesis to Be Tested 
In examining the risk management of U.S. life insurers, we would like to test 
whether life insurers operate under risk limiting mode (finite risk hypothesis) or risk 
seeking mode (excessive risk hypothesis). 
The finite risk hypothesis (see Baranoff and Sager, 2002 and 2003 and Baranoff, 
Papadopoulos and Sager, 2007) posits a positive relationship between capital and the 
various enterprise risks: the greater the risk, the greater the capital, ceteris paribus. Under 
this hypothesis, insurers tend to balance the assumption of more of one type of risk with 
the reduction of another type of risk. Thus, if the addition of living guarantees to variable 
annuities contracts increases insurer product risk, we may expect an insurer to raise 
capital, ceteris paribus. An opposing hypothesis, the excessive risk hypothesis (Baranoff 
and Sager, 2002 and 2003 and Baranoff, Papadopoulos and Sager, 2007) maintains that 
under certain conditions, the assumption of additional risk in one area can trigger still 
further risk taking in another, such as the reduction of capital. The events in the financial 




3.1.2 Data and Summary Statistics  
Our selection of variables is motivated by conventional capital structure modeling, 
together with the special concerns of the current study. We use data from annual filings 
of life insurers with the NAIC for 2006 and 2007. The total account value and reserve for 
variable annuities with guarantees are taken from page 22.1 in the NAIC annual filing for 
those years.  
Three key variables are capital, asset risk, and guarantee risk. We study how life 
insurers balanced their capital against asset risk and guarantee risk (reflecting the risk of 
VAGLB) in 2006 and 2007. The three variables are scaled to help neutralize the effects 
of insurer size. For capital, we define CAP = book value of insurer capital / total insurer 
assets. For asset risk, we scale OAR (asset risk) by dividing by insurer total invested 
assets. For VAGLB guarantee risk, we first scale the VAGLB guarantee risk proxy by 
dividing by total related account value. Then we apply neglog transformation to include 
all insurers with VAGB business.69 CAP and OAR are also used in log form in order to 
reduce skewness. 
“Business strategy” variables are used in the analysis. The business strategy refers 
to the mix of product specialties in which an insurer does most of its business. Baranoff 
and Sager (2003) find that the greater the uncertainty regarding the outcome of an 
                                                          
69  Guarantee risks can be negative, zero or positive. Neglog transformation is a technique to adjust for the 
skewness for variables with negative, zero or positive values. Specifically, for insurers with negative or 
zero guarantee risk, neglog transformation is NegLog(GuarRisk) = log(1 - GuarRisk); for insurer with 
positive guarantee risk, neglog transformation is NegLog(GuarRisk) = log(1 + GuarRisk). See Whittaker, 
Whitehead, and Sommers (2005). 
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insurance product, the greater the impetus for financing via capital. They argue that the 
major categories of life insurance products (annuities, life insurance, health and accident 
insurance, reinsurance) carry distinctive risk characteristics that differentially inform 
insurer behavior. We use the proportion of writings in each line (pAnnuity, pLife, 
pHealth) to capture business strategy effects.70 Each proportion assesses the extent of 
insurer involvement with the corresponding product. Because of our emphasis in this 
paper on guarantee risks, we extend Baranoff and Sager’s business strategy variables to 
include an additional business strategy variable, pVAGB, that similarly measures the 
extent of the insurer’s involvement with VAGB products. pVAGB is the total account 
value of variable annuities with guaranteed benefits, divided by life insurers’ total assets. 
Note that the numerator of pVAGB tallies the related account value for all types of 
guarantees, both living benefits and death benefits, although the focus of our risk analysis 
for this paper is on living benefits. By broadening the business strategy variable to 
include death benefits as well as living benefits, this strategy variable therefore looks to 
the offering of any type of guarantee as the essential strategic and behavioral 
differentiator among insurers, rather than the type of the guarantee. However, in the risk 
analysis of this paper, we look to living benefit guarantees as more worrisome than death 
benefit guarantees, both for the insurer and for society (in the form of possible systemic 
risk). Note also that the pVAGB predictor is used in our analysis as a control for business 
strategy rather than as a direct measure of guarantee risk. Therefore, pVAGB should not 
be confused with GuarRisk, our proxy for the risk of living benefit guarantees. To be sure, 
                                                          
70 We omit reinsurance to avoid a multicollinearity. 
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one could argue that pVAGB may represent an exposure risk for benefit guarantees. But 
to the extent that it actually does so, its presence as a predictor in our models may 
attenuate the effect of GuarRisk, therefore conservatively reducing the significance that 
we find for GuarRisk.  
Three of our control variables represent measures of firm size (total assets, total 
premiums, and total liabilities). These are strongly correlated with each other. To reduce 
the possibility of multicollinearity, these three variables are combined by taking the 
logarithm of their geometric mean (logSize). A principal components analysis suggests 
that the first principal component of the three (log) variables explains well over 90% of 
their variation and weights each variable about equally, whether the components are 
extracted in standardized or unstandardized mode. Applying the logarithm also reduces 
the skewness of the distribution. The life risk-based capital ratio (RBCratio) is included 
as an indication of regulatory forbearance. As a performance and/or earnings indicator, 
return on capital (RetOnCap) is included (e.g., Berger, 1995; and Berger and Patti, 2006 
– both studies for banks). Insurers that are members of an affiliated group of firms may 
have superior access to investment opportunities and may have different mechanisms for 
monitoring and/or controlling managerial performance and structuring their capital and 
asset risk. To capture this possibility, we include a 0-1 indicator for whether the insurer is 
a member of a group (NGROUP). Stock insurers and mutual insurers are faced with 
different financing costs when raising capital (Laux and Muermann, 2010). Therefore, 
stock insurers and mutual insurers may manage their capital differently. So we include a 
0-1 indicator for whether an insurer is a stock firm (NTYPE). Underwriting VAGB 
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products exposes life insurers to more market risk. Insurers may hedge that risk by use of 
derivatives. An insurer’s posture toward capital accumulation is affected by its 
willingness to manage risk by hedging. Therefore we include a 0-1 indicator for whether 
an insurer is active in derivative use (IndDeriv).  
Table 3.1 lists definitions of variables used in our analysis. Table 3.2 provides 
summary statistics for those variables in year 2006 and 2007 separately. There are 145 
insurers underwriting VAGB products in each year. In 2006, 66 insurers provided 
guaranteed death benefit only. In 2007 such insurers are 60 in number. Therefore, 79 life 
insurers underwrote VAGLB in 2006 and 85 in 2007. Ultimately, we could use 78 
insurers in 2006 and 84 in 2007. Two insurer-years were dropped on account of outlier 
and wrong data record.  
Table 3.1 Definitions of Additional Variables 
Variable Name Definition 
CAP Capital/Assets 
Atotal Total assets 
Wtotal Total writings 
LiabTot Total liabilities 
logSize Log(Atotal*Wtotal*LiabTot)/3 
OAR Opportunity asset risk / Total invested assets 
pHealth Health writings / Total writings 
pAnnuity Annuity writings / Total writings 
pLife Life writings / Total writings 
pVAGB Total account value for VAGB / Total assets 
RBCratio 100*Market capital / (2*Authorized capital) 
RetOnCap Income / Book capital 
Ntype Organizational type (1=Stock) 
Ngroup Indicator for member of affiliated group (1=Yes) 






Table 3.2 Summary Statistics for Key Capital Structure Variables for Life Insurers Underwriting VAGB 
Variables 2006 N Sum Mean Std Dev 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
CAP 145  0.0921 0.1120 0.0433 0.0640 0.0981 
Atotal 145 3,830,685,200,000 26,418,518,376 44,764,847,784 3,046,829,441 9,123,635,604 23,761,828,797 
Wtotal 145 476,032,106,152 3,282,980,042 5,379,762,852 320,369,479 1,057,279,433 3,763,512,029 
LiabTot 145 3,641,875,300,000 25,116,381,478 42,994,424,529 2,721,114,704 8,197,606,470 22,166,484,495 
OAR 145  0.0020 0.0003 0.0018 0.0020 0.0022 
pHealth 145  0.0786 0.1698 0.0000 0.0070 0.0655 
pAnnuity 145  0.5333 0.3566 0.1977 0.5425 0.8597 
pLife 145  0.3072 0.3200 0.0344 0.1988 0.4880 
pVAGB 145  0.3738 0.3715 0.0382 0.2694 0.6091 
RBCratio 144  918.9842 2227.4400 366.1404 453.1382 645.2311 
RetOnCap 144  0.0825 0.2211 0.0451 0.0910 0.1592 
Ntype 145 133 0.9172 0.2765 1 1 1 
Ngroup 145 139 0.9586 0.1999 1 1 1 
IndDeriv 145 86 0.5931 0.4930 0 1 1 
          
Variables 2007 N Sum Mean Std Dev 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
CAP 145  0.0927 0.1136 0.0405 0.0644 0.1031 
Atotal 145 4,179,415,600,000 28,823,555,524 48,358,960,459 3,211,690,427 9,917,632,927 29,148,525,843 
Wtotal 145 519,665,567,571 3,583,900,466 5,842,884,558 377,420,109 1,087,582,798 3,911,472,033 
LiabTot 145 3,971,196,000,000 27,387,558,695 46,265,581,890 2,907,608,884 8,956,359,021 27,414,019,709 
OAR 145  0.0022 0.0009 0.0016 0.0019 0.0023 
pHealth 145  0.0853 0.1768 0.0000 0.0089 0.0658 
pAnnuity 145  0.5214 0.3626 0.1363 0.5284 0.8732 
pLife 145  0.2972 0.2953 0.0534 0.1946 0.4621 
pVAGB 145  0.3738 0.4118 0.0301 0.2104 0.5695 
RBCratio 144  849.5911 1704.8900 359.8129 458.4470 678.3760 
RetOnCap 144  0.0425 0.2690 0.0261 0.0764 0.1231 
Ntype 145 132 0.9103 0.2867 1 1 1 
Ngroup 145 140 0.9655 0.1831 1 1 1 





3.1.3 Empirical Methodology  
To address our major questions, we develop standard capital structure models that 
show the relationship between the capital ratio, on the one hand, and a number of 
recognized risk factors and control variables, on the other hand, including OAR (asset 
risk) and GuarRisk (VAGLB guarantee risk). The finite risk hypothesis predicts that an 
increase in one type of insurer risk will be compensated by a reduction in another type of 
risk. For example, an increase in asset risk (such as OAR) or an increase in product risk 
may be balanced by an increase in capital [reduced leverage and financial risk]. In fact, 
Beatty, Gron, and Jorgenson (2005) found that a sample of nonfinancial firms that had 
dropped product liability insurance actually reduced overall firm risk through 
compensating risk management strategies. Among articles about the insurance industry, 
Cummins and Sommer (1996) for the property/casualty insurers and Baranoff and Sager 
(2002 and 2003) for life/health insurers have also found empirical support for finite risk. 
In our capital regression models, we therefore expect to find positive coefficients for 
OAR and GuarRisk if this hypothesis prevails. The excessive risk hypothesis (Baranoff 
and Sager, 2002 and 2003) predicts that an increase in one type of risk can trigger still 
further risk in another, such as the reduction of capital. Hypothesized circumstances that 
could promote excessive risk taking include a “go-for-broke” attitude in the presence of a 
moral hazard, such as guarantee funds. If this hypothesis holds, we may expect to find 
negative coefficients for OAR and GuarRisk in a regression model for capital. 
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The methodology is conventional regression, with a tweak to adjust for 
autocorrelation. Since we have a panel data set with the same insurers in two different 
years, within-insurer autocorrelation should be taken into account. We use Generalized 
Estimating Equations (GEEs) methodology for this purpose (Liang and Zeger, 1986). 
Statistically insignificant control variables have been dropped from the model. 
3.1.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
We investigate first the posture of those insurers that underwrote VAGLB 
towards the guarantee risk of VAGLB. Were these insurers in a finite risk or an excessive 
risk mode? Table 3.3 shows the fitted capital structure model in three panels, 
corresponding to the three VAGLB model portfolios. The data for the three panels are the 
same, except only for the calculation of the VAGLB risk variable, GuarRisk, which 
varies according to the proportion of stocks and bonds in the model portfolio. 
Table 3.3 Benchmark Capital Structure Model - Dependent 
Variable is log (capital/total assets). Three Scenarios for 
VAGLB Risk using 288 Firm-years 2006 - 2007  
Panel A: 50% Equity 50% Bond 
Parameters Estimates Std Err Z-Value 
P-
Value 
Intercept 1.8886 0.2666 7.08 <.0001 
logOAR 0.0756 0.0027 27.90 <.0001 
logGuarRisk50/50 -0.6975 0.0543 -12.84 <.0001 
Size -0.2790 0.0065 -43.12 <.0001 
pHealth -0.1043 0.0336 -3.11 0.0019 
pLife 0.0601 0.0094 6.40 <.0001 
pVAGB 0.0506 0.0049 10.37 <.0001 
logRBCratio 0.4193 0.0054 77.25 <.0001 
RetOnCap 0.0410 0.0036 11.54 <.0001 
Ntype -0.6329 0.2285 -2.77 0.0056 
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IndDeriv -0.1137 0.0048 -23.57 <.0001 
Scale 0.8142 . . . 
R2 0.3318       
     
Panel B: 60% Equity 40% Bond 
Parameters Estimates Std Err Z-Value 
P-
Value 
Intercept 1.9584 0.2672 7.33 <.0001 
logOAR 0.0759 0.0027 27.92 <.0001 
logGuarRisk60/40 -0.5755 0.0493 -11.68 <.0001 
Size -0.2819 0.0065 -43.56 <.0001 
pHealth -0.1092 0.0337 -3.25 0.0012 
pLife 0.0597 0.0094 6.32 <.0001 
pVAGB 0.0492 0.0049 10.04 <.0001 
logRBCratio 0.4189 0.0054 76.90 <.0001 
RetOnCap 0.0419 0.0036 11.74 <.0001 
Ntype -0.6351 0.2293 -2.77 0.0056 
IndDeriv -0.1136 0.0048 -23.45 <.0001 
Scale 0.8170 . . . 
R2 0.3313      
      
Panel C: 80% Equity 20% Bond 
Parameters Estimates Std Err Z-Value 
P-
Value 
Intercept 2.0718 0.2682 7.72 <.0001 
logOAR 0.0765 0.0027 27.98 <.0001 
logGuarRisk80/20 -0.3925 0.0406 -9.68 <.0001 
Size -0.2866 0.0065 -44.30 <.0001 
pHealth -0.1168 0.0338 -3.45 0.0006 
pLife 0.0581 0.0095 6.10 <.0001 
pVAGB 0.0475 0.0049 9.61 <.0001 
logRBCratio 0.4184 0.0055 76.33 <.0001 
RetOnCap 0.0431 0.0036 12.04 <.0001 
Ntype -0.6389 0.2307 -2.77 0.0056 
IndDeriv -0.1138 0.0049 -23.32 <.0001 
Scale 0.8220 . . . 




We find support for the finite risk hypothesis in life insurers’ asset risk-taking and 
risk-taking in conventional products such as life insurance and health insurance. The 
positive coefficient of logOAR suggests that the industry posture was to expand capital if 
asset risks increase. The coefficient represents an elasticity since both dependent and 
independent variables are in log scale. So, a one percent increase in asset risk would be 
expected to produce about a 0.08 percent increase in the capital ratio for all model 
portfolios, ceteris paribus.  
Interestingly, we also found support for the excessive risk hypothesis in life 
insurers’ risk-taking on VAGLB products. The negative coefficients of 
logGuarRisk50/50, logGuarRisk60/40, logGuarRisk80/20 indicate that insurers with 
more guarantee risk for living benefits have lower capital ratios than insurers with less 
guarantee risk, ceteris paribus. Even though both the dependent variable logCAP and the 
VAGLB guarantee risk are in logarithm, the coefficients of the guarantee risk are no 
longer elasticities because of neglog transformation on the guarantee risk as explained in 
the footnote in section 3.1.2. In fact, the actual elasticity is smaller than the coefficients in 
the results.71  A possible explanation for negative coefficients of VAGLB guarantee risk 
is suggested by widespread use of derivatives among our panel of insurers that write 
VAGLB (56 of 79 insurers underwriting VAGLB in 2006 and 63 of 85 in 2007). In the 
                                                          
71 The coefficients of predictors in a regression are elasticities when both the dependent and independent 
variables are in logarithmic scale. For example, when logY = βlogX + ε, the coefficient 
)//()/(log/log XXYYXY ∂∂=∂∂=β , which is just the elasticity. By neglog transformation, the 
regression equation changes to logY = βlog(X+1) + ε. 
)]1/(/[)/()]1/()1(/[)/()1log(/log XXYYXXYYXY +∂∂=++∂∂=+∂∂=β , which is 
greater than )//()/( XXYY ∂∂ , the elasticity.   
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model of Table 3.3, the negative coefficient for derivative use suggests that insurers that 
use derivatives have lower capital ratios than insurers that do not use derivatives, ceteris 
paribus. Insurers may believe that the use of derivatives to hedge the additional asset-
related risks of guarantees provides a sufficient offset to these new risks and therefore 
that further capital need not be accumulated for that purpose.72  
Results for the four business strategy variables are generally as expected. Only the 
annuities variable (pAnnuity) is not significant and is therefore omitted and uncontrolled 
in the model of Table 3.3. Positive coefficients on pHealth and pLife indicate that capital 
is accumulated as exposures to the risks of writing health and life insurance increase. The 
larger coefficient of pHealth supports the notion, argued by Baranoff and Sager (e.g., 
2003), that health insurance is relatively riskier to the insurer than life insurance – and 
that both are relatively riskier than annuities, which have no impact on capital for this 
panel of insurers in this model. A possible surprise is the negative coefficient of the 
guarantee exposure variable pVAGB. However, the discussion of the risk-mitigating 





                                                          
72 “It has been noted that regulatory reserve and capital requirements drive life insurers to employ effective 
hedging techniques to mitigate the risks in order to optimally reduce capital and reserve requirements.” 




3.2 Risk Management by Capital in U.S. Health Insurance Industry 
3.2.1 Hypotheses to Be Tested 
In examining the risk management of U.S. health insurers, we would like to test 
two major hypotheses as we already discussed in chapter 1: finite vs. excessive risk 
hypothesis and the business-strategy hypothesis. 
If the finite risk hypothesis (or risk-limiting or risk-averse hypothesis) describes 
the behavior of health insurers, then we expect to find that health insurers that assume 
high asset risk through their choice of investments would accumulate large amounts of 
capital as a counterbalance and vice versa. On the other hand, if the excessive risk 
hypothesis (or risk-seeking hypothesis) prevails, then we expect to find high asset risk 
associated with low capital accumulations and vice versa. In our models, we examine 
evidence for these two hypotheses in the interrelationship between capital and asset risk 
as simultaneously interacting endogenously determined variables. 
As we discussed in chapter 1, the business-strategy hypothesis argues that an 
insurer’s choice of business product is fundamental. Other financial and organizational 
decisions flow from that basic choice, including the trade-off between capital and asset 
risk that would be deemed appropriate to balance the risks of the chosen business 
products. The argument implies that there is an effect that runs from product risk to 
capital and asset risk. Therefore, the argument could support the treatment of product risk 
as econometrically pre-determined. But the argument does not preclude a bi-directional 
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effect. If an effect also runs from capital and/or asset risk to product risk, then product 
risk should be treated as endogenous, along with capital and asset risk.  
Baranoff and Sager (2002) treated product risk as endogenous in their study of the 
life insurance industry. For life insurers, it is plausible that capital and/or asset risk could 
affect product risk. When a firm selects life insurance as a business strategy, the firm 
must not only choose the life industry, but also it must choose a mix of life products. The 
life industry offers a diversified array of products of varying risks, from relatively low 
risk annuities to high risk health insurance. If a life insurer experiences an increase in 
market risk of its asset portfolio, for example, the insurer potentially could balance that 
increase in asset risk by adjusting its mix of life products, (for example, to put more 
emphasis on annuities and less on health) and still remain with the life industry. 
On the other hand, the U.S. health insurance industry differs sufficiently from the 
life insurance industry that one may question a bi-directional role for product risk among 
health insurers. The choice of health insurance as the business product should still affect 
capital and asset risk choices, per the business-strategy hypothesis.  However, the reverse 
direction is more problematic. By choosing to be a health insurer, a firm has already 
chosen a high degree of product risk. Moreover, the health industry is more homogeneous 
in its products than the life industry is. There is one dominant health line – 
comprehensive – with many attributes of high risk and with which most health insurers 
are involved at substantial exposure levels. As long as a firm remains a health insurer, it 
may have less scope to vary product risk in response to changes in capital or asset risk. 
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We are therefore open to the possibility that product risk for the health insurance industry 
could be either pre-determined or endogenous. To resolve the issue, we appeal to the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002), which we apply to capital, 
asset risk, and product risk in our model. We find that non-endogeneity is rejected for 
capital and asset risk, but cannot be rejected for product risk.  
We therefore treat product risk as econometrically pre-determined. 73 Logically, 
this implies that product risk could influence capital and asset risk choices, but that 
capital and asset risk choices would generate minimal feedback to product choices. We 
also use other risk measures and control variables to help isolate the impact of the 
product risks on the capital and asset risk decisions. These additional variables include 
loss ratios and utilizations. To test the business strategy hypothesis in this setup, we look 
to the statistical significance of our product risk proxies in our model.  We find that 
product risk has significant effects upon capital and asset risk in our two structural 
equations. 
3.2.2 Data and Summary Statistics  
The dataset was extracted from the annual statements filed by U.S. insurers with 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for 2001 – 2008. Our 
sample is a panel that numbers 735 health insurers in 2001 and increases to 878 in 2008.  
                                                          
73 A predetermined variable may be distinguished from an exogenous variable conceptually by asking 
whether the variable values are really set externally to the firm (exogenous), or are merely treated as given 
(predetermined). For estimation purposes, both cases are treated the same. 
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Altogether, there are 6,431 firm-years of data. 74   The NAIC data provide detailed 
reporting on different lines of health business, which include comprehensive, Federal 
programs (equivalent to comprehensive), dental, vision, Medicare supplemental, 
Medicare and Medicaid.75 Next, we will discuss how we define all the variables we use 
in our analysis except product risk proxy and asset risk proxy since we have covered 




For capital, we use the ratio of total book capital to total assets. A high capital 
ratio is associated with low risk; a low capital ratio is associated with high risk. For 
nonfinancial firms, the debt-to-equity ratio is often used to assess this source of risk. 
However, insurers typically have little conventional debt, since most liabilities are in the 
form of actuarially calculated reserves for paying future claims.  
Control Variables   
Table 3.4 lists the definitions of all variables used in our model. The 
predetermined/exogenous controls include firm size, which has been implicated in many 
studies as an important factor for capital and risk. In this study, many of the key variables 
have already been adjusted for size by conversion to ratios (CAP = capital-to-asset ratio, 
                                                          
74 After excluding 56 firm-years for which the capital ratio was anomalously outside the range 0 to 1. 
75 Medicare and Medicaid processed for Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
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RBCratio, RetOnCap = net income / capital, Product Risk and Asset Risk are as 
described above). But we include size explicitly to mop up remaining unadjusted effects. 
Three obvious size proxies are total assets, total liabilities, and total premiums collected. 
These three are rather highly correlated with each other, however, and their inclusion as a 
group in a regression model may induce collinearity issues. Therefore, we decided to 
combine them by taking the logarithm of their geometric mean and calling the result 
Size.76   
Since the insurance industry is highly regulated, we use the risk-based capital 
ratio (RBCratio = 100 * Total market capital / (2 * total authorized risk capital)) as an 
indicator of regulatory forbearance. Return on capital (total income / total market capital) 
is also included as an indicator of earnings and performance (Berger, 1995; and Berger 
and Patti, 2006). Agency theory predicts that the governance type of insurance companies 
(stock or mutual) affects their risk taking behavior. So an indicator variable (Stock 
insurer = 1 if stock company, = 0 if not) is used to represent the governance type. If an 
insurer belongs to an affiliated group of companies, access to the resources of sister firms 
might affect the insurer’s risk taking behavior. Another indicator variable (In group = 1 if 
a member of an affiliated group, = 0 if not) is included for this reason. Use derivatives (= 
1 if there is derivative activity, = 0 if not) is taken as an indicator for sophistication of 
health insurers. The number of states in which a health insurer is licensed to conduct 
                                                          
76 Supporting this approach is the fact that a principal components analysis showed that the first principal 
component explains 95% of the variation of the group. Furthermore, the factor loadings of the three are 
about equal, which supports the equal weighting implied by the geometric mean. 
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business (States of licensure) may also affect its risk management behavior, because 
health insurance product risk is related to geographic and demographic factors. 
In addition to the above generic exogenous variables, we also include two sets of 
predictor variables that are specific to the health insurance industry, loss ratio and 
utilization. The loss ratio is defined as the underwriting deduct (the sum of total hospital 
and medical expenses, claims adjustment expenses, administrative expenses, and the 
increase in reserves) divided by total premium income from health insurance. If an 
insurer does not underwrite a specific group of lines of business, we record zero loss ratio 
for that group. The loss ratio represents the fraction of health insurance income 
attributable to claims and other charges that originate from health insurance underwriting. 
It is an important indicator of health insurers’ underwriting performance or profitability. 
A high loss ratio means low profitability. Besides loss ratios for each group individually, 
we also examine the total health loss ratio as an overall profitability indicator for each 
insurer.  
We evaluate Utilization of medical services by three factors: number of provider 
encounters, number of hospital patient days, and number of inpatient admissions. First, 
we divide the number of medical services of each group by corresponding premiums of 
that group. In this way, we obtain the number of provider encounters per premium dollar, 
number of hospital patient days, and number of inpatient admissions per premium dollar 
for each group. Then we standardize each scaled number of medical services per dollar 
for each group. That is, we subtract the mean of the unstandardized value for the group, 
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then divide by the standard deviation of the unstandardized value for the group. Finally, 
we calculate the mean of the three types of standardized scaled number of medical 
services per dollar for each group. If an insurer does not underwrite lines of business in a 
specific group, the corresponding utilization will be recorded as zero. In this way, 
utilization reflects the total number of medical/hospital services provided per premium 
dollar or, alternatively, an inverse of price of coverage per utilization. Thus, utilization 
may capture some of the efficiency, or inefficiency, of service delivery.  
Table 3.4 Variable Definitions 
  Variables Description 
Endogenous 
Variables 
Capital Capital / Total Assets 






(Comprehensive Premium Income + Federal Employee Benefits Plans Premium 
Income) / Total Assets 
Limited Coverage 
Product Risk (Dental Premium Income + Vision Premium Income) / Total Assets 
Medicare Product 
Risk (Medicare Premium Income + Medicare Supplement Premium Income) / Total Assets 
Welfare Product Risk Medicaid Premium Income / Total Assets 
Working Population 
Utilization  
(Standardized Number of Provider Encounters Per Premium Dollar for Working 
Population Group + Standardized Number of Hospital Patient Days Per Premium 
Dollar for Working Population Group + Standardized Number of Inpatient Admissions 
Per Premium Dollar for Working Population Group) / 3  
Limited Coverage 
Utilization* 
Standardized Number of Provider Encounters Per Premium Dollar for Limited 
Coverage Group 
Medicare Utilization 
(Standardized Number of Provider Encounters Per Premium Dollar for Medicare 
Group + Standardized Number of Hospital Patient Days Per Premium Dollar for 
Medicare Group + Standardized Number of Inpatient Admissions Per Premium Dollar 




(Standardized Number of Provider Encounters Per Premium Dollar for Welfare Group 
+ Standardized Number of Hospital Patient Days Per Premium Dollar for Welfare 
Group + Standardized Number of Inpatient Admissions Per Premium Dollar for 
Welfare Group) / 3  
Working Population 
Loss Ratio** 
(Comprehensive Underwriting Deduct + Federal Employee Benefits Plans 
Underwriting Deduct) / (Comprehensive Premium Income + Federal Employee 
Benefits Plans Premium Income) 
Limited Coverage 
Loss Ratio** 
(Dental Underwriting Deduct + Vision Underwriting Deduct) / (Dental Premium 
Income + Vision Premium Income) 
Medicare Loss 
Ratio** 
(Medicare Underwriting Deduct + Medicare Supplement Underwriting Deduct) / 
(Medicare Premium Income + Medicare Supplement Premium Income) 
Welfare Loss Ratio** Medicaid Underwriting Deduct / Medicaid Premium Income 
Health Loss Ratio** Health Insurance Total Underwriting Deduct / Total Premium Income from Health Insurance  
Size Geometric Mean of (Total Assets, Total Liabilities, Total Writings) 
Return on capital Return on Capital = Total Income / Total Book Capital 
In group? In Affiliated Group (1), Not in Affiliated Group (0) 
Stock insurer? Stock Firm (1), Non-Stock Firm (0) 
Use derivatives? Indicator of Derivative Activity (1=Yes) 
States of licensure Number of States of Licensure 
* For Dental and Vision insurance, majority of hospital patient days and inpatient admissions are zeros. Thus we only include doctor's 
visit in the utilization calculation.  




Table 3.5 profiles the health insurance industry for our study. The table shows 
summary statistics for all the endogenous and exogenous variables used in our analysis. 
All insurers that file with the NAIC under the Health category are included, except for 
health insurers with capital-to-asset ratio below 0 or above 1. To save space, we supply 
summary statistics for even-numbered years only. 
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Table 3.5 Summary Statistics for NAIC Health Insurers 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008* 
 2002  2004  2006  2008 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median   N Mean 
Std 
Dev Median N Mean 
Std 
Dev Median   N Mean 
Std 
Dev Med  
Capital ratio 731 0.525 0.246 0.481  730 0.583 0.215 0.547  821 0.593 0.225 0.571  827 0.59 0.213 0.  
Asset risk 770 0.004 0.005 0.003  765 0.005 0.003 0.004  872 0.003 0.002 0.002  877 0.008 0.009 0.  
Working population utilization** 428 0.325 0.728 0.183  416 0.215 1.195 0.067  419 0.493 0.908 0.284  423 0.393 1.197 0  
Limited coverage utilization** 80 2.105 2.177 1.428  80 1.942 2.333 1.13  105 1.814 2.149 1.128  115 0.599 2.697 0  
Medicare utilization** 187 0.927 1.313 0.449  201 0.644 1.193 0.232  283 0.574 1.172 0.127  354 0.599 1.124 0.  
Welfare utilization** 165 1.436 1.008 1.16  156 1.308 1.241 1.062  163 1.28 1.063 1.103  167 1.295 1.227 1.  
Working population loss ratio*** 449 1.018 0.209 0.99  438 1.012 0.249 0.976  439 1.019 0.225 0.98  440 1.022 0.216 0.  
Limited coverage loss ratio*** 249 0.947 0.267 0.953  244 0.939 0.189 0.951  257 0.956 0.204 0.955  265 0.961 0.231 0  
Medicare loss ratio*** 201 0.971 0.175 0.958  220 0.975 0.232 0.963  301 1.002 0.216 0.957  377 1.01 0.238 0.  
Welfare loss ratio*** 172 0.996 0.162 0.991  164 1.012 0.238 0.981  174 1.012 0.27 0.984  178 1.041 0.29 0.  
HealthLossRatio 700 1.003 0.223 0.985  687 0.999 0.231 0.971  761 1.01 0.231 0.976  801 1.021 0.215 0.  
Size**** 771 16.06 2.451 16.417  766 16.19 2.459 16.536  874 16.28 2.473 16.483  878 16.48 2.402 16.  
logRBCratio 727 5.682 1.418 5.413  730 5.898 1.393 5.611  816 6.033 1.651 5.668  821 5.909 1.375 5.  
Return on capital 732 0.008 1.983 0.113  732 0.097 1.186 0.138  821 0.125 0.89 0.12  827 0.283 7.046 0.  
In group (1/0) 771 0.652 0.477 1  768 0.685 0.465 1  874 0.697 0.46 1  878 0.705 0.456  
Stock insurer (1/0) 771 0.728 0.445 1  768 0.727 0.446 1  874 0.732 0.443 1  878 0.736 0.441  
Use derivatives (1/0) 771 0.003 0.051 0  768 0.009 0.095 0  874 0.007 0.083 0  878 0.008 0.089  
State of licensure 771 1.405 2.576 1   768 1.582 3.593 1   874 2.055 5.341 1   878 2.534 6.904  
 
* Product risk proxies are not shown to save space. Product risk proxy statistics can be found in Table 2.4 
** Utilization is as defined in Table 3.4. The utilization summary statistics for a particular one of the four groups omit insurers that are not active in that group. Thus N for each of the four groups is less than the total count  
insurers.  
*** The loss ratio summary statistics for a particular one of the four groups omit insurers that are not active in that group. Thus N for each of the four groups is less than the total count of insurers. 




We note just a few additional points about our sample of health insurers.  First, 
comprehensive health insurance together with federal employee health benefit plans (the 
working population group) are the pre-dominant lines of health insurance (See Table 2.4 
for product risk data). For example, in 2008, 445 of our health insurers underwrote 
comprehensive, and 164 of our health insurers underwrote federal employee health 
benefit plans (as shown in table 1.3), which resulted in 452 health insurers in the working 
population group.  Furthermore, even though the loss ratios of the four groups vary from 
year to year, they are consistently in the ascending order of limited coverage group, 
Medicare group, Medicaid group and working population group. As we noted earlier, the 
loss ratio is an important indicator of health insurers’ underwriting performance. In fact, a 
higher loss ratio on average reflects a higher risk level for a specific line of business. 
Thus, consistent with the theoretical foundation of TCE, the working population 
embodies the highest product risk level and we expect health insurers’ capital structure to 
be sensitive to change in the working population product risk.   
A brief mention of some overall comparison statistics for the Life and Health 
industries instructively emphasizes the distinctive character of the health insurance 
industry for this study.  For 2008, total premiums for our sample of health insurers are 
more than 2.5 times total invested assets, whereas total premiums for the Life77 industry 
are only about one quarter of invested assets. So the ratio of premiums to invested assets 
is more than ten times larger for the health insurance industry than for the life insurance 
industry. Cash constitutes about 17% of health insurers’ invested assets, but only 5% of 
                                                          
77 All insurers that report to the NAIC in the Life category. 
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life insurers’ invested assets. So health insurers hold proportionately about 3.5 times as 
much cash in their portfolios as life insurers. We believe that these differences between 
the two industries are driven by the differences between their business products as 
predicted by the business strategy hypothesis. 
3.2.3 Empirical Methodology  
Since we view capital and asset risk as mutually interacting and endogenous, we 
deploy a simultaneous equation model with two structural equations, one for capital and 
one for asset risk. Each structural equation has its own set of predetermined/exogenous 
control variables, including our product risk proxies, which are treated as predetermined.  



























t XXPACA εββββββ +++++++= − 1110  
(1) 
where C is the insurer capital-to-asset ratio, A is the asset risk index, and P is the vector 
of two product risk indices. Although P is singled out to emphasize its special role in the 
business-strategy hypothesis, P is treated the same for estimation as any other 
predetermined/exogenous variable X. A appears in the structural equation for C, and C 
appears in the structural equation for A. This aspect of the model represents the assumed 
mutual interaction between A and C. The role of the lags 1−tC and 1−tA is to capture effects 
on C and A that are not isolated by other predictors and that are strong enough to linger 
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on into the next year. Both A and C are used in logarithm scale in the model. The log 
transformation makes them more nearly normal and enables the interpretation of their 
coefficients as elasticities.  
The estimation methodology is two-stage least squares with instrumental 












t XXA εααα ++++= 110  
(2) 
Each reduced form equation is estimated separately and uses the complete set of 
predetermined/exogenous variables from Table 1. Of course, all endogenous variables 
and their lags are also excluded from the right-hand sides of (2). Since we have a panel 
dataset, the covariance matrix of the errors in (2) is block-diagonal, so OLS estimation 
should not be used. Instead we use the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEEs) 
methodology (Liang and Zeger, 1986) for autoregressive errors, as implemented in 
SAS. 78 The resulting estimated values ( *tC  and 
*
tA ) of tC  and tA , respectively, are 
instruments for use in the second stage of the two-stage least squares methodology. 
Substituting the first stage instruments into the right-hand side of (1), we then estimate 
the second-stage model: 
                                                          




































Each equation is again estimated separately. Use of the instruments permits asset risk to 
“participate” in the capital equation, and vice-versa, while removing the correlation 
between the endogenous predictors and the errors that makes OLS inconsistent in (1). 
Because of the panel data structure, we again have autocorrelated errors in (3), so we 
again employ GEE. Variable selection for the stage 2 models was informed by the need 
to insure identifiability of parameters, by the importance attached to variables by 
previous research, and by stepwise regression to achieve parsimonious models. The 
results of the second stage analysis are discussed in the next section. 
3.2.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Table 3.6 presents results for stage two of the two-stage least squares estimation 
methodology discussed in the methodology section. We apply the neglog transformation 
(referenced previously) to product risk proxies in order to adjust for skewness, yet retain 
insurers with zero premium income in certain lines of business. The main issues for 





Table 3.6 Estimates of the simultaneous structural equations (stage 2)  
for capital-to-asset ratio and asset risk 
 Capital Equation   
Asset Risk 
Equation 
  Estimate 
P-
Value   Estimate 
P-
Value 
Intercept 0.6127 0.0278  -3.3956 <.0001 
Working Population Product Risk 
(log) 0.1213 <.0001  -0.2063 <.0001 
Limited Coverage Product Risk (log) 0.0891 <.0001  -0.1284 <.0001 
Medicare Product Risk (log) 0.0118 0.4764  -0.0512 0.1302 
Welfare Product Risk (log) 0.0430 0.0055  -0.1469 <.0001 
Asset Risk Instrument (log) 0.2450 <.0001    
Capital Ratio Instrument (log)    1.1000 <.0001 
lag Capital Ratio (log) 0.2530 <.0001    
lag Asset Risk (log)    0.4242 <.0001 
Size -0.0577 <.0001  0.1395 <.0001 
RBCratio (log) 0.1734 <.0001  -0.1931 <.0001 
NGroup 0.0713 <.0001  -0.1322 <.0001 
Health Loss Ratio 0.0630 <.0001    
Scale 0.3039 .  0.7410 . 
      
Sample Size 5,003   5,031  
R2 0.5742     0.3200   
 
The results in Table 3.6 suggest an important role for product risk as a pre-
determinant of the capital ratio and asset risk, as judged by the significant coefficients of 
product risk.  As expected, a given increase in working population product risk is 
associated with a greater increase in capital ratio than the same increase in product risk of 
the other groups. The signs of the coefficients also comport with the finite-risk hypothesis 
for product risk in both the capital and asset risk equations. That is, an increase in product 
risk is associated with an increase in capital and a decrease in asset risk.  
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On the issue of finite risk versus excessive risk for the interplay between capital 
and asset risk, we look to the coefficient of asset risk in the capital equation and to the 
coefficient of capital in the asset risk equation.  Since both variables are in log scale, their 
coefficients are elasticities. The elasticity of capital with respect to asset risk is 0.245. 
This means that an increase in asset risk of one percent is associated with an increase in 
the capital ratio of 0.245 percent. The relationship is positive, which means that capital 
increases when asset risk increases, ceteris paribus. This suggests that health insurers 
balance an increase in asset risk with the safety of a financial risk-reducing increase in 
capital – in keeping with the finite risk hypothesis. Correspondingly, the elasticity of 
asset risk with respect to capital is 1.1. That is, an increase in capital can support a similar 
magnitude of increase in asset risk. This is the inverse of the case for the elasticity of 
capital with respect to asset risk. This, too, is consistent with finite risk.  
Results suggest that product risk plays an important role in capital structure 
decisions of health insurers. Health insurers respond to the product risk increase by 
building up more capital, which is consistent with the finite risk hypothesis. The 
responsiveness of capital to different product risk proxy depends on the product risk level 
as we identified in Section 2.2.1. The working population coefficient of 0.1213 is highest 
among the groups of product lines. More capital is needed to mitigate an increase in the 
product risk of comprehensive and FEHP insurance because these products embody the 
highest level of product risk. Compared to private insurance groups, Medicare and 
welfare groups put much less pressure on insurers’ capital structure. The coefficient of 
the welfare group is only 0.043, about one third of the working population group. Though 
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positive, the coefficient of the Medicare group is not significant. Therefore, health 
insurers’ major product risk concerns lie in the working population and the limited 
coverage groups, which are their private or commercial lines of business. Finally, there is 
some question as to whether product risk should be treated as endogenous. To test this, 
we applied the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002), which confirms our 
treatment of capital and asset risk as endogenous and of the product risks as non-
endogenous. 
A further technical issue involves the potential for survivor bias in our sample. In 
selecting our sample, we elected to use whatever insurers reported to the NAIC in the 
Health category each year. As some insurers dropped out of the sample on account of 
merger, acquisition, insolvency, or other reasons, other insurers were allowed to join. So 
survivor bias, understood as the biasing effect of sample attrition, does not apply to our 
panel. We elected to allow the panel to vary from year to year in order to reflect the 
actual composition of the industry. An alternative would have been to select all insurers 
present in the data in all eight years, 2001-2008. The alternative could be criticized for 
biasing results toward large insurers, since small insurers are more likely to leave or join 
the panel over time. As a test of the robustness of our analysis, we ran the same analysis 
with the alternative stable panel of insurers. We found much the same results as shown in 
Table 3.4. In the interest of space, we do not show those results here. 
For the remaining predetermined/exogenous predictors in Table 3.6, we observe 
that their coefficients are generally consistent with previous literature for other sectors of 
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the insurance industry. As might be expected, the lags of the endogenous variables are 
highly significant in their own respective equations. The lags embody the composite 
effects of a host of factors that are not explicitly measured by our models – just offset by 
one year. Size is negatively related to capital-to-asset ratio, which suggests that large 
firms may feel that their size itself confers a partial measure of safety.  RBC ratio is 
positively related to capital-to-asset ratio. Firms close to the threshold of regulatory 
scrutiny (low RBC ratio) are associated with lower capital levels and higher asset risk. 
High returns on capital contribute to capital accumulation. In the asset risk structural 
equation, we see that large firms tend to hold riskier assets, perhaps feeling that size 
offers a partial offset to risk – a view that may have been shaken by the 2008/2009 












Findings and Contributions 
Life Insurance Industry 
In the life insurance industry, we identify a new product risk created by 
guarantees of VAGLB products. We introduce guarantee risk, a new proxy, to measure 
VAGLB product risk. The guarantee risk innovation is based on simulation of future 
bond and equity returns using methodology developed by VARWG. The simulated 
returns are applied to model portfolios of VAGLB annuitants. Deficiencies occur when 
poor market returns cause actual portfolio values to lag behind guarantees. The guarantee 
risk metric is a value-at-risk measure equal to the mean of the worst 30% of deficiencies 
in a 10,000-iteration simulation of the next 30 years.  
We further study how variable annuities with guaranteed living benefits (VAGLB) 
affect the capital ratio of life insurers. Using a capital structure model that includes asset 
risk and guarantee risk in a context of other enterprise risks and controls, we find support 
for both the “finite risk” and “excessive risk” regimes in the industry. In particular, 
increased asset risk is accompanied by increased capital (finite risk prevails), ceteris 
paribus. But less capital is held as guarantee risk increases (excessive risk prevails). 
Since lower capital ratios are also associated with use of derivatives, it may be that 
insurers view their hedging activities as providing adequate coverage for the new risks of 
variable annuity guarantees. 
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Health Insurance Industry 
The health insurance industry is a critical intermediary between health care 
consumers and health care providers in the U.S. The financial health of health insurers is 
thus of great importance and may become even more so after the passage of PPACA.   
In this dissertation we focus on the relationship between capital and two major 
types of risks of health insurers: product risk and asset risk. These relationships have 
been studied previously for the life insurance, property/casualty insurance and banking 
industries.  This is the first study to provide such examination for the health insurance 
industry. The study provides important principles for predicting the behavior of the health 
insurance industry as it reacts to new legislative and regulatory requirements, such as 
those of PPACA. Therefore, we test whether the industry manages its capital vis-à-vis 
investing and underwriting in a risk-limiting or risk-seeking manner and assess the 
strengths of those relationships. We also examine evidence for the business-strategy 
hypothesis that suggests choices of capitalization and investing risk can be viewed as 
flowing from a prior choice of product risk level. To aid our investigation, we create 
product risk proxies in line with the concepts of transaction cost economics theory, 
especially heeding the consequences of incompleteness of contractual promises.  
Our study uses all U.S. insurers that report to the NAIC as health insurers during 
2001-2008. We find that our panel of health insurers acts to limit risk by balancing an 
increase of one type of risk with a decrease in another type. We also find support for the 
business-strategy hypothesis. The results of our research show that the industry is 
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operating under the “finite risk” paradigm and that the elasticity of capital with respect to 
asset risk is low.   
Empirical tests support our underlying theoretical view: For health insurers, 
product risk acts as a predetermined driver of endogenous, mutually interacting capital 
and asset risk decisions.  Furthermore, our empirical findings suggest that health insurers 
take compensatory offsetting actions in other areas to deal with regulatory or other 
actions that increase their risk. The major elements of PPACA – uncapping benefit limits, 
guaranteeing coverage to all, and loss ratio minima – add to product risk. If insurers 
remain within the realm of finite risk, they will seek to offset these increases in product 
risk. Whether they increase capital or re-price their products, or some combination, 
depends upon the size of the required adjustments, access to capital markets, regulatory 
and consumer resistance, and competition.  
Future Studies 
Life Insurance Industry 
While examining life insurers’ risk-taking behavior towards the new product risk, 
the guarantee risk, we have another interesting finding: life insurers’ capital is negatively 
related to the guarantee risk controlling for derivative hedging. A possible explanation is 
that life insurers rely on derivatives hedging as a viable risk management tool so much 
that they decrease the capital level. This observation is consistent with findings in the 
other industries (see Leland 1998, Purnanandam 2008 and Lin et al 2008). And we also 
notice that the elasticity of capital to asset risk in our capital structure model is lower than 
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what is found in similar studies for the life insurance industry (see Baranoff and Sager 
2002, 2003). A possible explanation could be that life insurers reorganized their risk 
metrics and took more overall enterprise risks   using derivatives hedging as a flexible 
and effective risk management tool.  
Are life insurers relying on derivatives as a viable risk management tool? It is a 
serious question to be answered based on what we’ve found in life insurers’ current risk-
taking behavior. With more product risk or asset risk and less capital, life insurers are 
more likely to experience financial distress or even insolvency. Moreover, the use of 
derivatives is found mostly in large insurers that are systemically important. Their 
financial well-being is critical to the whole life insurance industry. Therefore, our future 
research might address issues such as:  
Whether life insurers’ performance changes with the involvement of derivatives 
hedging;  
Whether life insurers’ risk-taking behavior changes with the involvement of 
derivatives hedging; 
Whether life insurers’ risk-taking behavior changes differently with the 
involvement of derivatives hedging for stock vs. mutual insurers;  
Whether life insurers’ performance change is caused by the change of risk-taking 
behavior or the increase of overall risk;  
Whether the volatility of life insurers’ performance changes as well, which we 







Health Insurance Industry 
In the health insurance industry, we find the risk proxies for health insurers’ 
product risk and asset risk and build a preliminary capital structure model. Consistent 
with our expectations, health insurers are also operating under a risk-limiting mode. Our 
research on capital structure in the health insurance industry is the first one to our 
knowledge. However, it is just a start.  
In our research, we notice that health insurers operate under a complicated health 
care delivery system. Health insurers’ customers and claimants are different agents. 
Health insurers that file with NAIC have more organizational forms as well (BC/BS, 
HMO, and insurers). Health care services are delivered through various managed care 
networks (HMO, PPO, PSO and PSO). Health insurance products are riskier products on 
average. And factors such as coverage, age group and source of premiums all contribute 
to uncertainties. Meanwhile, health insurers’ annual statements provide more detailed 
information such as medical services utilization and expenses. There are numerous 
interesting topics that can be studied based on the above features we identified. 
Currently, a topic to our great interest is the cost of health care. It is also a current 
concern in healthcare economics but mostly from a macroeconomic perspective (see 
Okunade and Murphy 2002, Hartwig 2008 and Buchmueller et al 2005, etc.). However, 
with detailed NAIC health insurers’ annual statements, our perspective is on the micro-
level. Our key question is: what is the relationship between healthcare costs and health 
insurers’ financial management? Financial management is a broad concept, which can 
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involve health insurers’ organizational form, capital structure, asset risk, product risk, etc. 
Cost might also have a number of representations for insurers such as medical expenses, 
claims, and utilization. Our goal is to study what features of financial management help 
to control or lower healthcare cost for insurers controlling for other factors such as 
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